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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. beef industry has used growth hormones in meat
production since the 1970s, and the European Communities ("E.C.")
have resisted the introduction of such hormones into their meat
supply for almost as long.' Both sides have since been engaged in a
battle influenced by powerful economic forces that refuse to let
either side back down. 2
The powerful U.S. beef industry and its interest in realizing profits
from exporting a greater supply of beef at a lower cost motivates the
United States to maintain pressure on the E.C.3 Though the exact
1. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL, THE CITIZENS' GUIDE TO
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY: TRADE CASE-STUDY: BEEF
HORMONE DISPUTE, http://www.foei.org/trade/activistguide/hormone.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting that part of the reason for the ban is that Europeans
have expressed the desire to keep their meats free of growth hormones regardless
of the potential risks).
2. See George H. Rountree, Note, Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the
World Trade Organization's Decision in the European Union - United States Beef
Dispute, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 607, 607-10 (1999).
3. See Chuck Lambert, Jan. - November 2001 Beef Exports Decrease .8% in
Volume and 6% in Value, Jan./Feb. 2002, http://www.beef.org/newsjanuary
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amount of lost profits varies depending on the source of the statistics,
it is clear that the U.S. beef industry has suffered as a result of the
ban.4 At the same time, E.C. leaders are mindful of its health and
safety conscious population that demands a voice when it comes to
measures affecting their food.5 E.C. leaders are in fact supported by
examples of specific food trends resulting from European awareness
and concern over food production.6
With neither side willing to back down, the dispute continues to
rage on, once again making its way through the World Trade
Organization's ("WTO") Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").7
However, this time the E.C. could finally be successful in its bid to
february20022764.aspx (stating that U.S. exports of beef between January 1 and
November 30, 2001 totaled 1,171 metric tons of beef, with an estimated value of
$3.144 billion); see also Letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on Finance, to Pascal Lamy, Trade Comm'r, European Comm'n (Nov. 18,
2004), available at http://www.useu.be/Article.asp?ID=IDF3BEE3-5EF5-4E1A-
AEBF-6A276 59FCD2C (expressing severe criticism over the E.C.'s action,
calling it a game of "smoke and mirrors" and proclaiming that the beef producers
in the United States are the ones that are truly suffering).
4. See Kristin Mueller, Note, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the
Hormone Treated Beef Trade Dispute Between the United States and the European
Union, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97, 101 (1996) (suggesting that because the amount
of potential profit is far greater than the actual dollar value of beef exported, there
is a significant segment of the U.S. beef industry that is unable to maintain a
productive level of non-hormone treated beef exports to Europe).
5. See Hormones: Conference Planned to Discuss Safety and Import Ban,
AGRI SERV. INT'L NEWSLETTER, June 9, 1995 (conveying the sentiments of E.U.
Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler that while the ban on hormones may
undergo a review, the E.C. will not do so without taking into consideration
consumer views).
6. See Mueller, supra note 4, at 102, n.50 (observing that beef consumption
dropped in E.C. countries where illegal use of hormones developed, but
consumption increased in those countries with a reputation for having hormone-
free meat).
7. See Press Release, European Comm'n, E.U.-U.S.: E.U. Requests WTO to
Confirm that There is No Justification for US/Canada to Continue to Apply
Sanctions (Nov. 8, 2004), http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/04/1345&format=-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
[hereinafter Press Release, E.U. Requests WTO to Confirm No Justification]
(discussing the E.C.'s initiation of a new WTO action to compel the United States
to withdraw its sanctions against E.U. exports, imposed in retaliation to the E.U.
ban on hormone-treated beef).
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have the WTO validate its hormone policy.' Additionally, the United
States might find itself with a slap on the wrist from the WTO for
failing to abide by the rules of the game.9
Part I of this Comment will review the initial E.C.-Hormones
Panel and Appellate Reports and the standards established therein, 0
as well as the U.S. refusal to accept the new Directive as bringing the
E.C. into compliance with the DSB rulings." Part II analyzes the
new Directive and demonstrates how it meets the requirements of the
DSB's rulings and recommendations. 2 Part II also analyzes the
validity of the U.S. action in making the determination that the E.C.
measures remain inconsistent with the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") and argues that the DSB
should find the United States in violation of the WTO dispute
settlement process. 3 Finally, Part III will recommend that the DSB
begin evaluating sanitary and phytosanitary measures ("SPS
measures") with a greater emphasis on the "precautionary
principle."' 4 Part III also argues that the DSB should require original
8. See infra Part II.A (arguing that the E.C. has met the requirements for
maintaining its hormone policy despite not conforming to international standards).
9. See infra Part II.B (suggesting that the United States acted unilaterally, in
contravention of the WTO's Understanding Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
when it failed to bring an Article 21.5 proceeding against the new E.C. Directive).
10. See infra Part I.A (outlining the E.C. hormone ban and the legal grounds
for the DSB's invalidation of Council Directive 96/22/EC).
11. See infra Part I.B-F (discussing the rules and procedures of dispute
resolution and the United States' continued suspension of concessions).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B (arguing that the United States acted unilaterally in
breach of its WTO obligations); see also Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the
Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, 496-97 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]
(establishing the procedures to which Members must adhere when developing
measures to protect human and sanitary health); World Trade Org., A Summary of
the Final Act of the Uruguay Round: Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/ursum_e.htm #bAgreement
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting that the purpose of the agreement is "to
harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible,"
while still recognizing that nations must retain a degree of sovereignty in their
choices of health and safety measures).
14. See infra Part III.A (urging the WTO to acknowledge the importance of the
"precautionary principle" embodied within Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement by
2005] 225
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complainants to follow the mandate of Article 21.5 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes ("DSU") when another Member enacts a new SPS measure
designed to comply with a prior DSB ruling, regardless of whether
the DSB previously authorized an initial suspension of concessions. 5
I. BACKGROUND
A. RESOLUTION OF THE INITIAL HORMONE DISPUTE
The E.C. first banned the importation of consumable meats
produced with the aid of growth-promoting hormones in 1989.16 The
United States immediately sought action under international trade
law to remove this hormone ban, which it considered an illegal trade
barrier. 7 However, it was not until the Members of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) established the WTO
and the SPS Agreement that the United States had an appropriate
vehicle through which to raise its concerns over the E.C.
prohibition. 8
looking more closely at whether SPS measures are arbitrary or unjustifiably
discriminatory).
15. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the language of Article 21.5 is neutral and
thus must apply equally to all Members regardless of whether the DSB previously
awarded a Member the right to suspend concessions in the same matter).
16. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON VETERINARY
MEASURES RELATING TO PUBLIC HEALTH, ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL RISKS TO
HUMAN HEALTH FROM HORMONE RESIDUES IN BOVINE MEAT AND MEAT
PRODUCTS 1 (1999), http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/chemicalsafety/
contaminants/hormones/sci opinion-en.htm [hereinafter 1999 SCVPH REPORT]
(explaining that the ban on such meat products extends to animals treated by any
method of hormones that are administered with the intent of facilitating growth in
the animal).
17. See Mueller, supra note 4, at 99-100 (stating that the United States and the
E.C. worked under the GATT provisions to find a compromise). The United States
demanded that parties employ the scientific method of the GATT "Standard Code"
to evaluate the issues. Id. at 100. However, the Europeans sought resolution under
the GATT "national treatment" basis, whereby foreign and domestic products are
treated equally. Id.
18. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13; see also David A. Wirth, The Role of
Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 817, 823-24 (1994) (concluding that the dispute between the United States and
the E.U. over the E.U.'s prohibition of hormone-treated beef provided the impetus
226 [21:221
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In 1996, the E.C. reformulated its policy, providing for a complete
ban on some of the most commonly used growth-promoting
hormones for beef production. 9 The United States subsequently
brought the dispute before the DSB on January 31, 1996, asserting
that Council Directive 96/22/EC constituted food safety measures
that did not comport with the SPS Agreement.2° The DSB Panel
Report agreed that the measures were inconsistent, 2' and the
Appellate Body affirmed this conclusion after amending the report.22
for many of the provisions in the SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement "was
designed to prevent the abuse of.. . phytosanitary measures," which can include
measures that may otherwise be identified as "non-tariff barriers to trade." Id.
19. See Council Directive 96/22, pmbl. 4, arts. 4-5, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3, 5-6
(EC) (setting forth a total ban on the use of hormones where they are used for the
specific purpose of growth promotion). The Directive sets out certain exceptions
for which the Member States and importers may use the various hormones. Id. The
permissible uses include therapeutic purposes, zootechnical treatment, estrus
synchronization, and treatment of foetus maceration, mummification and pyometra
in cattle. Id. Even when administering the hormones for approved usages, Member
States must follow the strict guidelines laid out by the Directive. Id.; see also
ELLIN DOYLE, FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, HUMAN SAFETY OF HORMONE
IMPLANTS USED TO PROMOTE GROWTH IN CATTLE: A REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC
LITERATURE 2 (2000) (observing that these growth promoting hormones are
widely used not only in the United States, but also in Canada and Australia). Doyle
indicates that, as of July 2000, thirty countries had approved the use of at least one
of these hormones for the purpose of growth promotion in meat production. Id.
20. See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities
- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/1 (Jan.
31, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. Request for Consultations] (explaining that the United
States viewed the E.C.'s measures as inconsistent with the GATT 1994, Article III
or Article XI; the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Article 2; and the
Agreement on Agriculture, Article 4). Specifically, the United States believed that
the E.C.'s Directive violated Articles 5.1, 5.5, 3.3, and 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.
Id. 79.1.
21. See Panel Report, E.C. Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), TT 8.28, 8.30, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Panel
Report, E.C. Measures] (concluding that of the original agreements to which the
United States cited, the SPS Agreement and GATT were applicable to the dispute).
The Panel found that an analysis of the E.C.'s measures based on GATT 1994 was
unnecessary because, as a threshold matter, the measures were inconsistent with
the SPS Agreement. Id. T 8.272. The Panel ultimately held that the E.C. Directive
was inconsistent with Articles 5.1, 5.5, 3.3, and 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. Id.
9.1.
22. See Appellate Body Report, E.C. Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 253, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
Appellate Report, E.C. Measures] (upholding the Panel's finding that the E.C.
227
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The final report concluded that the E.C. measures were
inconsistent only with Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.23
Article 3.3 permits Members to adopt SPS measures that provide a
higher level of protection than those following international
standards. 24 However, SPS measures that do not comply with the
requirements of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement are also inconsistent
with Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.25 Most importantly, Members
must base all of their SPS measures on an assessment of the risks to
human health ("risk assessment") that is specific to the harms the
SPS measures are designed to confront.26
measures were inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement,
despite noting several points of error committed by the panel); see also Dispute
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held on Feb. 13. 1998, 8, WT/DSB/M/42
(Mar. 16, 1998) (providing an in-depth description of the comments made in the
meeting in which the Appellate Body decided to uphold the Panel Report). See
generally Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities, EC Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/9 (Sept. 25, 1997)
(citing the specific areas of law under the SPS Agreement in which the E.C.
believed that the Panel was incorrect in its initial determination); Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 art.
16.4, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401,
411, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (establishing that unless a party to a
dispute gives notice of its intention to appeal or the Members of the DSB decide
otherwise by consensus, the DSB adopts all panel reports within sixty days of the
report being circulated); Appellate Body Report, Working Procedures for
Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/5, R. 20(1) (Jan. 4, 2005) (providing the
requirements for a notice of appeal, which include notification in writing to the
DSB that follows the requirements of paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the DSU, with
concurrent notification to the WTO Secretariat).
23. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 253 (reversing the
Panel's conclusions that Directive 96/22/EC was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and
5.5 of the SPS Agreement). The Appellate Body also reversed several of the
panel's general interpretations of the SPS Agreement. Id.
24. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 3.3 (stating that the adoption of
SPS measures that are more protective than international standards must be based
on scientific justification).
25. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 177 (concluding that
in "consideration of the object and purpose of Article 3 . . . compliance with
Article 5.1 was intended as a countervailing factor" to the well recognized right of
Members to determine their own appropriate level of SPS protection).
26. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5.1 (providing that this "risk
assessment" can be conducted "as appropriate to the circumstances" that surround
the implementation of the specific SPS measures); see also Appellate Report, E. C.
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The DSB determined that the E.C. failed to meet the requirement
of basing its measures on a valid risk assessment because none of the
reports the E.C. relied upon to support its measures concluded that
there was a risk to human health. In fact, the Panel noted that all of
the E.C.'s studies concluded the use of growth hormones was safe,
assuming good veterinary practice.28 Therefore, the DSB declared the
Directive to be inconsistent with the E.C.'s obligations under the SPS
Agreement.2 9
B. REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID RISK ASSESSMENT
The initial E.C.-Hormones Panel Report held that a valid risk
assessment, relevant to the use of growth hormones, must identify
the potential adverse risks associated with the presence of
contaminants in products intended for human consumption. ° This
Measures, supra note 22, T 180 (agreeing with the Panel that Articles 2.2 and 5.1
of the SPS Agreement should be read together, as "the elements that define the
basic obligation set out in Article 2.2 impart meaning to Article 5.1"); SPS
Agreement, supra note 13, Annex A art. 2.2 (stating that "Members shall ensure
that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure" applies only to situations in which the
measure is necessary to protect human, animal or plant health and that Members
must base these measures on scientific principles and sufficient scientific
evidence).
27. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, $T 196-98
(recognizing that while the E.C. did produce one expert opinion, which found a
risk to human health, the study did not focus specifically on the risk posed by the
consumption residues found in meats treated with the growth hormones in dispute).
28. See id. 77 196-97 (agreeing with the Panel's conclusion that the SPS
measures were not rationally supported by the studies to which the E.C. cited).
29. See id. IT 207-08 (affirming the panel's ultimate conclusion that the E.C.
prohibition on the use of growth hormones in meat production and the related
prohibition on the importation of such meats was not based on a risk assessment).
The Appellate Report also reversed the Panel's conclusion that the scientific
information that the E.C. submitted constituted a valid risk assessment under the
SPS agreement. Id.
30. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13, Annex A 4 (defining two types of
risk assessments). The first type of risk assessment covers the possibility of entry
or spread of disease and the possible resulting harms. Id. The second type of risk
assessment covers adverse health effects from "additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs." Id.; see also Panel
Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 21, 8.98 (affirming that the residues found in
meats treated with the six hormones in dispute are included within the definition of
contaminants).
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evaluation must include (1) an identification of the particular risk to
human health, and (2) an evaluation of the potential for those adverse
effects to occur.3' The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the
E.C. failed to meet these requirements, but also determined that the
DSB must equate the term "potential" with the notion of possibility
rather than probability.32 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate
Body rejected the Panel's implication that a risk assessment must
establish a minimum quantifiable level of risk.33
The DSB has also established that each of the elements identified
by the E.C.-Hormones Panel must also meet a specificity
requirement.34 The Japan-Measures Affecting Importation of Apples
Appellate Body concluded that Japan's risk assessment, which
evaluated all possible modes of importation of Fire Blight,35 was not
31. See Panel Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 21, 8.98 (citing the language
of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement as being determinative of the requirements for
a valid risk assessment).
32. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 184 (concluding that
the term probability would indicate a "higher threshold of potentiality" than
implied by the use of "possibility" in the SPS Agreement, as it adds a "quantitative
dimension to the notion of risk"). But see Appellate Body Report, Australia-
Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 123, WT/DS 18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998)
[hereinafter Appellate Report, Australia-Salmon] (revisiting the Appellate Body's
conclusion from E.C.-Hormones that the term probability should be understood
as degrees of likelihood, and concluding that the term "likelihood" connotes
probability).
33. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 186 (concluding that
a panel is authorized to determine merely whether a disputed SPS measure is based
on a valid risk assessment, which means the panel's authority extends only to
determining "whether [the] measure is sufficiently supported . . . by the risk
assessment"). A panel does not have the authority to require that a risk assessment
contain indications of the "magnitude of risk" involved. Id.
34. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Importation of
Apples, 202-03, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Appellate
Report, Japan-Apples] (reviewing the section of the analysis in E.C-Hormones
in which the Appellate Body concluded that it is insufficient for a Member to
evaluate the potential adverse health effects of a contaminant in general, but rather
must evaluate the potential for adverse affects specific to the manner of the
contaminant and the precise method of exposure).
35. See Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
2.1-6, WT/DS245/R (July 15, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report, Japan-Apples]
(stating that Fire Blight is a plant disease that affects immature apples, explaining
the history of its spread from the United States to other countries, and noting how
the disease affects apples).
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specific enough to support sanitary measures against apples, since
apples were merely one mode of importation.36 The E. C.-Hormones
Appellate Report similarly concluded that the E.C.'s risk assessment
was not specific because its studies did not evaluate the potential risk
based on the specific use of hormones as growth promoters.37
C. MEMBERS MUST DEMONSTRATE A RATIONAL AND
OBJECTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK
ASSESSMENT AND SPS MEASURES
Once a Member establishes that a valid risk assessment exists, the
Member must demonstrate that its measure is based on that risk
assessment.3" The key to whether an SPS measure is "based on" a
risk assessment is that the measure is "sufficiently supported or
reasonably warranted by the risk assessment."3 9 Specifically, a
reasonable relationship requires a finding that "sufficient" scientific
evidence supports the SPS measure.4" The Japan-Measures
36. See Appellate Report, Japan-Apples, supra note 34, T 203 (suggesting that
Japan could not have asserted that a more specific risk assessment would find the
same results because the risk of entry of Fire Blight varies according to the
different modes of contamination).
37. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 199-200
(concluding that the studies the E.C. cited were not specific enough because they
failed to consider the specific risk that might arise from human consumption of
meat and meat products containing residues of the prohibited hormones). Those
studies merely evaluated the general "carcinogenic potential of entire categories of
hormones." Id.
38. See id. T 192-94 (rejecting the Panel's conclusion that the term "based on"
requires that SPS measures strictly conform to their supporting risk assessments).
39. See id. T 186 (affirming the panel's conclusion that a degree of uncertainty
will always exist because science can never prove to an "absolute certainty that a
given substance will not ever have adverse health effects" (emphasis in original)).
The Appellate Body stated unequivocally that "this theoretical uncertainty" is not
the type of risk that Members should evaluate in a valid risk assessment. Id.
However, the Appellate Report rejected the Panel's assertion that a valid
assessment of risk is limited to only what is scientifically measurable in a
laboratory. Id. 187. The Appellate Report concluded that "risk in human societies
as they actually exist" is an essential element that may be included in a valid risk
assessment. Id.
40. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products II, 73, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Report,
Japan-Agricultural Products] (concluding that the term 'sufficient' requires an
"adequate relationship between two elements").
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Affecting Agricultural Products II Appellate Body affirmed the
Panel's conclusion that Japan failed to provide sufficient evidence to
conclude that different varieties of the same product required
individualized testing where one test was sufficient for all varieties
of the same product.' Members must demonstrate sufficient
scientific evidence by showing a rational or objective relationship
between the SPS measures and the risk assessment conclusions. 2
The DSB determines the existence of such a rational or objective
relationship on a "case-by-case basis. 43 In its evaluation, the DSB
focuses on whether a Member's risk assessment "takes into account
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production
methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods," as well
as "risks arising from failure to comply with the requirements of
good veterinary practice . . ., [and] risks arising from difficulties of
control, inspection and enforcement of . . . good veterinary
practice." 44 This does not mean that a Member must undertake the
study on its own, or that the Member must obtain an assessment from
41. See id. 84 (noting that Article 2.2 requires "a rational and objective
relationship between the SPS measure and the scientific evidence"). Varietal
testing is a procedure by which exporters of certain agricultural products to Japan
may demonstrate effective quarantine providing the same level of protection
against the presence of the codling moth, something of quarantine significance to
Japan, which would be achieved by a prohibition on imports of the products at
issue. Id. 2; see also Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products II, T 8.42 WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Japan-
Agricultural Products] (acknowledging that varietal differences do not impact the
effective quarantine methods).
42. See Appellate Report, Japan-Agricultural Products, supra note 40, 72-
85 (concluding that Japan's varietal testing requirement for imported apples,
cherries, nectarines and walnuts is not rationally supported by sufficient scientific
evidence).
43. See id. T 84 (affirming that the quality and quantity of the scientific
evidence are key elements in the evaluations, which must be made with a view
towards the "particular circumstances of the case").
44. Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, T 205 (concluding that the
Panel erred in rejecting the use of non-scientific variables in a valid risk
assessment, including the non-compliance with good veterinary practice when
administering hormones during the meat production process); see also SPS
Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 5.2-5.3 (stating that Members may also take into
account certain ecological, environmental, and "relevant economic" factors).
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an independent body.45 Nor does this mean that a risk assessment
arriving at an alternative conclusion than other similar studies is per
se invalid.46 In fact, under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement,
Members may base their measures on "available pertinent
information" when there is a lack of scientific evidence.47 The
determinative factor is simply whether a rational and objective
relationship exists between the risk assessment and the SPS measure
that it supports.48
D. THE SPS AGREEMENT PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION TO THE
GENERAL REQUIREMENT THAT MEMBERS BASE THEIR
SPS MEASURES ON A VALID RISK ASSESSMENT
According to the Panel Report in Australia-Measures Affecting
Importation of Salmon, Article 5.7 is the sole exception to the
general rule that Members must base their SPS measures on a valid
risk assessment.49 Additionally, the exception permits only a
provisional deviation from the general rule.5° The Australia-Salmon
45. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 190 (noting that a
Member may rely on a risk assessment produced by another Member when
evaluating whether to adopt a particular SPS measure). The Appellate Body also
dismissed, as an error of law, the Panel's indication that Article 5.1 contains a
procedural requirement that mandates that Members take risk assessments into
account when enacting the SPS measures. Id. 188-89.
46. See id. 194 (stating that existing differences in opinion on the level of risk
is merely an indication of a valid scientific uncertainty).
47. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 5.7 (indicating that the SPS
Agreement permits provisional adoption of such measures in an effort to reach a
more objective risk assessment).
48. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (arguing that there is a rational and
objective relationship between the E.C. risk assessment and Council Directive
2003/74).
49. See Panel Report, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
8.57, WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Australia-Salmon]
(holding that the phrase "as appropriate to circumstances" within Article 5.1 of the
SPS Agreement does not provide an exception to the general rule of basing SPS
measures on a risk assessment, but merely refers to the methods by a which a risk
assessment is conducted).
50. See id. (concluding that because Australia enacted the measure at issue
more than twenty years prior to the hearing of this case, Australia could not rely on
Article 5.7, and the SPS measure could not be considered to be a provisional
measure).
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Panel concluded that Australia could not validate its prohibition on
the importation of fresh chilled or frozen salmon under Article 5.7's
exemption.5" Australia had its SPS measures in place for more than
twenty years and had clearly not maintained them as provisional.
5 2
The Japan-Agricultural Products II Appellate Body
acknowledged Article 5.7 as a "qualified exemption"53 and provided
that Members must first meet four requirements: (1) the relevant
scientific evidence must be insufficient; (2) the SPS measures must
be based on the available scientific information; (3) Members must
continue to gather information to conduct "a more objective risk
assessment"; and (4) Members must review the measure in light of
new information "within a reasonable period of time. 54 The DSB
concluded that Japan was not seeking to obtain more information to
produce a more objective risk assessment within a reasonable period
of time, as the SPS Agreement requires when invoking Article 5.7.55
The E.C.-Hormones Appellate Body concluded that the E.C. did
not base its SPS measures on a valid risk assessment, within the
meaning of Article 5.1, because the E.C. failed to produce reports
finding a risk to human health. 6 Because they were not based on a
51. See id. (rejecting Australia's contention that Article 5.1 provided an
exception to the general rule that SPS measures must be based upon a valid risk
assessment demonstrating sufficient scientific evidence).
52. Id. 8.57.
53. See Appellate Report, Japan-Agricultural Products, supra note 40, 80
(explaining that Article 5.7 operates as an exception to Article 2.2's requirement
that countries cannot adopt SPS measures without "sufficient scientific evidence").
54. Id. 89 (stating that if a Member fails to meet one of the requirements the
DSB will find the SPS measure inconsistent with the SPS Agreement). These
requirements are "cumulative in nature" and must be considered as having equal
importance. Id.
55. See Panel Report, Japan-Agricultural Products, supra note 41, 7 8.59-
8.60 (acknowledging that Japan had collected data from importing countries, and
that such information is applied validly in this respect, but relying on this
information alone did constitute total compliance with Article 5.7); see also
Appellate Report, Japan-Agricultural Products, supra note 40, 92 (maintaining
that "the information collected by Japan did not 'examine the appropriateness"' of
the varietal testing and assess whether varietal testing produces a more effective
method by which to prevent the importation of the codling moth).
56. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 208. Furthermore,
the E.C. in fact provided evidence only as to the administration of the disputed
hormones that is conducted while observing good veterinary practice and did not
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valid risk assessment, the E.C. SPS measures were inconsistent with
the requirements of Article 5.1 of the SPS agreement. 7
Consequently, because the SPS measures were not consistent with
Article 5.1, they were also inconsistent with Article 3.3.58 The DSB
did not undertake an assessment of the SPS measures under Article
5.7 because the E.C. specifically stated that Council Directive
96/22/EC was not a provisional measure. 9
E. THE E.C. SEEKS TO COMPLY WITH THE WTO
WHILE MAINTAINING ITS PROHIBITION OF
GROWTH-PROMOTING HORMONES
The E.C. adopted Council Directive 2003/74/EC on October 14,
2003 in an effort to comply with the DSB. 6° The preamble of the
Directive carefully puts forth the E.C.'s rationale for maintaining the
prohibition on certain growth-promoting hormones.61
"provid[e] an assessment of the potential adverse effects related to non
compliance" with good veterinary practices. Id. 207.
57. See id. 208 (noting that the only evidence the E.C. provided was actually
contrary to the SPS measures).
58. See id. 177 (affirming that the purpose of Article 3 is to dovetail the SPS
measures of the Members of the agreement while allowing the Members to retain
their rights and duties to "protect the life and health of their people"); see also id.
209 ("[A]n SPS measure to be consistent with Article 3.3, has to comply with,
inter alia, the requirements contained in 5.1."). The requirements of a risk
assessment supported by "sufficient scientific evidence" under Articles 5.1 and 2.2
are necessary to maintain this balance between the individual rights of the
Members and shared interests created by the SPS Agreement. Id. 177.
59. See Panel Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 21, 8.249.
60. See Council Directive 2003/74, pmbl. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17 (EC)
[hereinafter Directive 2003/74] (indicating that Directive 2003/74 is the result of a
concerted effort by the E.C. to produce a "complementary risk assessment," the
impetus for which was the outcome of the initial E.C.-Hormones case); see also
Press Release, European Comm'n, EU Complies with WTO Ruling on Hormone
Beef and Calls on USA and Canada to Lift Trade Sanctions (Oct. 15, 2003),
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1393&format-
HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Press Release, EU
Complies with WTO Ruling on Hormone Beef] (quoting the E.U. Trade
Commissioner as stating, "[t]oday's move shows that we are fully committed to
abiding by our WTO obligations.... I now call on the United States and Canada to
lift their trade sanctions against the E.U.").
61. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 13 (declaring that the
measures "are necessary to achieve the chosen level of health protection"); see also
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The fundamental problem with the E.C.'s implementation of its
measures prior to Council Directive 2003/74/EC was not that the
E.C. failed to cite scientific evidence.6 Rather, the evidence the E.C.
cited demonstrated little, if any, support for the conclusion that its
measures were justified.63 The E.C. now claims that scientific
evidence supports the implementation of Directive 2003/74/EC. 64
The crux of the E.C. claim is that current scientific evidence
demonstrates an identifiable risk to humans from the consumption of
hormone residues from treated meats, particularly those treated with
Oestradiol 17P.65 The E.C. also asserts that adverse health effects can
Press Release, EU. Complies with WTO Ruling on Hormone Beef, supra note 60
(emphasizing that public health and consumer protection are the E.C.'s top
priorities when considering food safety and that its approach is "guided by
independent scientific advice").
62. See Panel Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 21, 8.108-09 (listing the
variety of reports upon which the E.C. relied in its arguments, including reports
from scientific bodies that are both a part of and independent from the European
Union). The Panel also noted that the E.C. referenced several articles and opinions
from individual scientists that were relevant to the issue of using hormones as
growth promoters in meat intended for consumption. Id. The Panel accepted the
scientific nature of these reports and, in fact, made the assumption that they
collectively met the requirements for demonstrating the existence of a risk
assessment. Id. 8.111.
63. See id. 8.124 (concluding that none of the reports, articles and opinions
referenced by the E.C. to support its conclusion that the prohibition of meat and
meat products produced with growth hormones is justified demonstrates an
"identifiable risk" to human health from the consumption of such meats and meat
products); see also id. 8.139 (noting the E.C. argument that risks do arise from
the disputed hormones in the context of the "nature and mode of action of the
hormones; . . . the action of metabolites; . . . the action of combinations (or
cocktails) of hormones and from multiple exposure of humans; . . . problems
related to detection and control of hormones; ... [and] the administration and use
of hormones"). The Panel concluded, however, that the E.C. failed to provide any
evidence to contradict the finding that all of these risks are alleviated through the
use of good veterinary practices. Id. 8.142.
64. See Press Release, E.U. Complies with Hormone Beef Ruling, supra note
60 (observing that the E.U. initiated the process to enact the new Directive only
after the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures Relating to Public Health
concluded there were in fact certain health risks to humans from the consumption
of meat produced with growth promoting hormones).
65. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 8, 10 (suggesting that the
determination to maintain the prohibition as to all six hormones and expand the
prohibition against Oestradiol 1713 is supported by a full scientific evaluation of the
hormones within the 1999 SCVPH report). The Directive also notes that the
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be envisaged for the other five hormones,66 even though there is
insufficient evidence to quantify the possibility of risk to human
health.67
In addition to maintaining the restrictions on all of the hormones
in dispute, the new Directive actually increases the restriction on the
use of Oestradiol 173.68 Accordingly, the Directive continues to
establish a level SPS protection higher than that of relevant
international standards, which currently do not restrict the use of
most of the hormones in dispute. 69 Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement
does in fact allow Members to enact SPS measures that establish a
higher level of SPS protection "than would be achieved by measures
conclusions of the 1999 SCVPH report were reviewed twice, once in 2000 and
once in 2002, after the Committee became aware of new scientific information. Id.
8. In both reviews the committee affirmed the findings of the 1999 SCVPH
report. Id.
66. See id. 7 (indicating that it is impossible to assess the risk to public health
arising from these hormones based upon the consideration of epidemiological
findings and the current scientific understanding of the intrinsic properties of the
hormones).
67. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 72-73 (suggesting that the
insufficiency of available data stems from a general "lack of understanding of
critical development periods" in humans, as well as the "uncertainties in the
estimates of endogenous hormone production rates and metabolic clearance
capacity").
68. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 6 (stating that the scientific
evidence demonstrates that the scientific community should recognize Oestradiol
17P3 as a cancer-causing agent, "as it exerts both tumor-initiating and tumor-
promoting effects.. ."). For other hormones, Members must apply the prohibitions
on a provisional basis. Id. art. 3. The Directive sets a deadline of October 14, 2004
for the termination of all usages of Oestradiol 173. Id. art. 2(1).
69. See Panel Report, E.G. Measures, supra note 21, 11. 11 (explaining that the
SPS Agreement recognizes the standards set by the CODEX Alimentarius
Commission as the relevant international standards by which Members should
evaluate their food safety measures). The CODEX Alimentarius Commission is a
joint Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health Organization
("FAO/WHO") commission charged with developing food safety standards in
order to protect consumer health and promote fair trade practices. Id. 11. 12; see
also Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, CODEX
Alimentarius: Veterinary Drug Residues in Food (Sept. 2, 1999),
http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collections?subset=-FoodQuality [hereinafter CODEX
Alimentarius] (listing five of the six hormones at dispute in the E.C.-Hormones
case and indicating that adverse health effects from consumption of residues from
these hormones is unlikely, assuming that good veterinary practices are in place).
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based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations."7 However, the SPS Agreement permits such
measures only where there is scientific justification,7 a requirement
that the Appellate Report further determined requires a valid risk
assessment under Article 5.1.72 The E.C. maintains that sufficient
scientific evidence supports the new Directive, as reported in a 1999
study by the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures Relating
to Public Health ("SCVPH"), 3 and in two follow-up reports by the
same committee confirming the continued validity of the results in
the 1999 report.74
70. SPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 3.3 (noting also that such measures
must still maintain consistency with other relevant provisions of the Agreement);
see also Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81,
96, 98 (2000) (commenting on the Appellate Body's recognition in Japan-
Agricultural Products II that "Article 3.3 . . . was not written into the SPS
Agreement . . . [to allow] for otherwise inconsistent" measures, and therefore,
measures must be consistent with the provisions of Article 5 when Members resort
to Article 3.3 justification).
71. See Laurent A. Ruessmann, Putting the Precautionary Principle in Its
Place: Parameters for the Proper Application of a Precautionary Approach and
the Implications for Developing Countries in Light of the DOHA WTO Ministerial,
17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 905, 927 (2002) (remarking that the use of Article 3.3 is
permitted only where a Member deems it necessary to achieve its determined level
of appropriate SPS protection). Ruessmann concludes that Article 3.3 recognizes
the prerogative of Members to adopt what they consider to be the appropriate
levels of protection. Id.
72. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing the conclusions
of the Appellate Body, which held that to meet the requirements of Article 3.3,
Members must adhere to the requirements of Article 5).
73. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16; European Comm'n, Scientific
Committees: Food Safety, http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/committees/
scientific/indexen.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (explaining that the European
Commission appoints the SCVPH in accordance with Commission Decision
97/579/EC); see also European Comm'n, Scientific Committee on Veterinary
Measures Relating to Public Health: Mandate, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
food/fs/sc/scv/indexen.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (indicating that the
SCVPH's specific mandate is to answer "scientific and technical questions
concerning consumer health and food safety, and relating to zoonotic,
toxicological, veterinary and notably hygiene measures applicable to the
production, processing, and supply of food of animal origin").
74. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 8 (presenting the process that
the E.C. took in evaluating the scientific risks to humans from the consumption of
the cited growth hormones, which included reviewing all revised reports provided
by the various scientific bodies); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text
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The E.C. requested the SCVPH's services subsequent to the
DSB's 1998 ruling, when seeking further scientific evidence to
establish justification for its measures. 5 The E.C. invited the SCVPH
to evaluate the potential risks to human health from the consumption
of meat containing residues from the individual growth hormones its
SPS measures prohibit.76 The report concluded that there is an
identifiable risk of increased exposure to such residues,77 and
consequently an increased potential for risks to human health.78
(discussing the announcement of Directive 2003/74/EC and the Europeans' belief
that the Directive brings the hormone measures into compliance with the DSB's
rulings and recommendations).
75. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Commission Proposes Revised
Legislation Banning Hormones as Growth Promoters (May 24, 2000),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health consumer/library/press/press55_en.html
[hereinafter Press Release, Legislation Banning Hormones] (conveying that in
addition to the initial request for the SCVPH to conduct a study of the potential for
adverse health affects from the consumption of hormone residues in meats, the
E.C. also asked the committee to review its findings in light of new information
that arose after the 1999 report).
76. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 1 (implying that part of the
SCPVH's mandate was to evaluate whether it was necessary for the E.C. to revise
its previous risk assessments concerning the affects of growth hormone on human
health in light of new scientific evidence). SCPVH's mandate went beyond
evaluating basic scientific principles about the hormones themselves, extending to
an evaluation of the interaction of residues from the hormones and providing a
better "understanding of the critical role of imprinting in determining subsequent
development outcomes, the role of hormones in perinatal development .... [and]
the increase in a number of hormonally mediated, ... autoimmune and allergic
diseases." Id. at 2.
77. See id. at 36 (stating that consumption of Oestradiol 17-treated beef
results in an increased exposure to oestrogens of up to 84 ng per person per day).
The normal rate of intake is 6.8 ng per person per day. Id. The excess exposure to
testosterone from the consumption of treated beef can reach as high as 189 ng per
person per day. Id. at 48. This represents thirty-three percent of the acceptable
daily intake established by the FDA. Id. Consumption of beef treated with
progesterone results in an increased exposure level of between 64 and 467 ng per
person per day. Id. at 52. Any exposure to trenbolone acetate and melengestrol
acetate would be in excess of normal exposure because these hormones do not
occur naturally. Id. at 55, 67. Consumption of 500 g of beef per person per day can
result in consumption of Zeranol as much as 128 ug per person per day, almost
four times the acceptable daily intake. Id. at 64.
78. See id. at 73 (outlining the envisaged adverse health affects resulting from
the increased exposure to the studied hormones, which include increased risk of
cancer and developmental and neurobiological problems).
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These findings prompted the E.C. to maintain its prohibition by
enacting a new Directive.79
F. THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO WITHDRAW ITS SUSPENSION
OF CONCESSIONS, ASSERTING THAT THE NEW COUNCIL
DIRECTIVE FAILS TO BRING THE E.C. INTO COMPLIANCE
WITH THE DSB RULINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The E.C. promptly notified the DSB and the United States in
October, 2003 that Directive 2003/74/EC brought the E.C. measures
into compliance with the DSB rulings and recommendations. °
Consequently, the E.C. expected the United States to withdraw the
suspension of concessions.8' However, the United States steadfastly
rejected the notion that the new E.C. Directive did anything to bring
79. See Press Release, Legislation Banning Hormones, supra note 75
(emphasizing the importance of the findings of the 1999 SCVPH report and the
follow-up review in bolstering the E.C.'s commitment to maintaining the
prohibition on- the use of growth hormones in consumable meats and the
importation of such meats).
80. See Communication from the European Communities, European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/22 (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter EC Communication 22] (informing the
DSB that the E.C. had taken steps to produce a valid risk assessment in accordance
with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in E.C.-Hormones, and that the
E.C. considered its adoption of Directive 2003/74/EC as bringing the hormone
measures into full compliance with those rulings and recommendations); Dispute
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
November 7, 2003, 28, WT/DSB/M/157 (Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Nov. 7,
2003 DSB Meeting Minutes] (stating that the E.C. raised the issue of its
compliance with the DSB's rulings at the DSB's meeting and sought a response
from the U.S. and Canadian delegations); see also supra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the procedures that the E.C. took prior to enacting
Directive 2003/74/EC and the E.C.'s belief that. these measures provided the
necessary support required in order for the United States and the DSB to conclude
that the E.C. met its obligations under the SPS Agreement). See generally
Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, art. 11 (a) (suggesting that the E.C. did not secure
passage of the Directive until 2003); Press Release, Legislation Banning
Hormones, supra note 75 (noting that the initial proposal for the revised policy
occurred in May of 2000).
81. See EC Communication 22, supra note 80 (indicating that with the
publication and entry into force of Directive 2003/74/EC the suspension of
concessions by the United States and Canada, "[was] no longer justified"); see also
Nov. 7, 2003 DSB Meeting Minutes, supra note 80, 28 (stating that the E.C.
argued at a DSB meeting that the United States and Canada should withdraw the.
suspension of concessions in accordance with Article 22.8 of the DSU).
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the SPS measures into compliance.82 In reaction to the immediate
U.S. dismissal of the Directive, the E.C. brought the matter before
the WTO in November 2004,83 claiming the U.S. action was
inconsistent with GATT 1994 Articles I and II and DSU Articles
23.1, 23.2(a), 22.8, and 21.5.84
1. The United States Has Granted Most Favored Nation Status
to the E. C. and Must Not Deviate from the Schedule
of Concessions Unless Authorized to Do So
Because the United States has granted most favored nation status
to the E.C. under Article I of GATT 1994, the DSB will deem the
continued suspension of concessions inconsistent with Articles I and
II of GATT 1994, unless the WTO authorizes the suspension.85 The
82. See Nov. 7, 2003 DSB Meeting Minutes, supra note 80, 30 (observing
that it had been almost six years since the DSB recommended that the E.C. bring
its SPS measures into compliance with WTO obligations and the United States did
not believe that the adoption of Directive 2003/74/EC could be considered to be in
full compliance with the DSB's rulings and recommendations). The United States
indicated that it viewed the new Directive as merely a re-labeling of the original
Directive, which was found to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. Id.
83. See Request for Consultation by the European Communities, United
States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the E.C.-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS320/1 (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter E.C. Request for Consultation]
(outlining the history of the dispute, the action taken by the E.C. to bring its
measures into compliance, and the E.C.'s subsequent unilateral action).
84. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, United States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in E.C.-
Hormone Dispute, WT/DS320/6 (Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter E.C. Panel Request]
(asserting that the United States refused an agreement for resolving the current
dispute and requesting that the DSB address the E.C.'s request for the formation of
a panel at the DSB meeting on January 25, 2005).
85. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, WTO Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IA, art. 1(a), Legal
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT 1994] (annexing the provisions of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1947 into GATT 1994, with certain amendments and
modifications). Members must not accord less favorable treatment to other
Members of GATT 1994 than that provided for in the relevant parts of the
Schedule of Concessions. Id. art. 2, l(a); see also World Trade Org., Goods
Schedules: Members' Commitments (Jan. 13, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/schedules-e/goodsschedules e.htm (explaining that each schedule of
concessions is divided into four parts). The first two parts are most relevant to the
beef hormone dispute. Id. The first part sets the applicable duty rates for trade
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DSB authorized the United States to suspend concessions in 1999,86
after the E.C. failed to bring its SPS measures into compliance by the
fifteen month deadline the WTO Arbitration Body set in 1998.87
Despite the E.C.'s assertions to the contrary," the United States
maintains that no E.C. actions have changed this authorization.8 9 The
generally among the Members to the agreement. Id. The second part of the
schedule sets out the duty rates to be applied among those nations receiving most
favored nation treatment. Id.; DSU, supra note 22, app. 1 (indicating that the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization is covered under the DSU).
86. See Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Annex II, WT/DS26/ARB (July
12, 1999) [hereinafter Decision by the Arbitrators, Hormones] (listing precisely the
proposed items on which the United States could impose retaliatory tariffs until the
E.C. brought its measures into compliance with the DSB rulings and
recommendations).
87. See Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 48, WT/DS26/15 (May 29,
1998) (concluding that fifteen months would be a reasonable amount of time for
the E.C. to bring its measures into compliance with the DSB rulings and
recommendations). The Arbitration panel ruled that the fifteen months would run
from February 13, 1998, the date the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body
Reports. Id.; see also Communication from the European Communities, European
Communities-Hormones, WT/DS26/18 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter E.C.
Communication 18, E.C.-Hormones] (confirming that the E.C. informed the DSB
on May 12, 1999, the day before the deadline to comply with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB, that it was not in a position to lift the existing ban
on growth promoting hormones); Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 of
the DSU, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), at 1-2, WT/DS26/19 (May, 18, 1999) [hereinafter U.S.
Recourse to Article 22.2, E.C. Hormones] (observing that the United States
subsequently submitted a request for authorization to suspend concessions to the
E.C. on May 17, 1999). The United States claimed that the total impairment or
nullification suffered as a result of the E.C. measures was $202 million, and,
therefore, it sought to suspend concessions in the same amount per year until the
E.C. measures were brought into compliance with its WTO obligations. Id.
88. See Press Release, E.U. Requests WTO to Confirm No Justification, supra
note 7, (stating that the E.C. eliminated the "deficiencies" in its previous hormone
policy by basing the new Directive on a complete scientific risk assessment
conducted between 1999 and 2002).
89. See generally GLOBAL AGRICULTURE INFORMATION NETWORK, USDA
FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, GAIN REPORT No. E23193, EUROPEAN UNION
TRADE POLICY MONITORING: EUROPEAN UNION BANS ESTRADIOL, FOREIGN
AGRICULTURAL SERVICE (2003), - http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/
200311/145986807.pdf. [hereinafter GAIN REPORT I] (discussing Directive
2003/74/EC and the possibility that the Directive meets the DSB's
recommendations and rulings to bring the E.C. in compliance with WTO
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U.S. action clearly illustrates its contention that the E.C. Directive
does not bring the E.C. measures into full compliance with the
DSB.9° However, the E.C. insists the United States cannot make this
determination unilaterally.9" Rather, the E.C. claims that the United
States must resort to the DSB for such a determination.92
The DSB will resolve this particular element of the dispute
according to the rules and procedures that govern the suspension of
concessions as provided in the DSU.93 DSU Article 23.1 grants
Members the right to seek redress for violations of WTO
obligations. 94 However, Article 23.1 also requires that Members who
seek to redress violations abide by these rules and procedures. 95
obligations). The report states that the Directive still fails to meet the standards for
a valid risk assessment as outlined by the DSB in E.C.-Hornones. Id. at 2. The
report also claims that the SCVPH reports relied on by the E.C. do little more than
"discuss potential problems with earlier risk assessments" and provide a collection
of comments on seventeen "narrowly selected studies." Id. The report determines
that there are no conclusions "based on modem risk assessment principles." Id.
90. See Nov. 7, 2003 DSB Meeting Minutes, supra note 80, 29 (relaying the
U.S. allegation that the E.C. measures are still not "based on science," and that "no
increased health risk had ever been associated with the consumption of meat from
animals treated with growth-promoting hormones"). The United States specifically
cited the joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Studies which found that the
range of consumption of the questioned meat products presented no danger to
human health, as there was a large margin of safety for the consumption of such
products. Id.
91. See E.C. Request for Consultation, supra note 83, at 2-3 (alleging that the
United States acted unilaterally by failing to initiate dispute settlement proceedings
in accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU to determine whether the new E.C.
Directive was inconsistent with the E.C.'s WTO obligations).
92. See id. at 2 (stating that the U.S. action did not comply with GATT 1994
Articles I and II, and Articles 23.1, 23.2(a), 23.2(c), 22.8, and 21.5 of the DSU);
see also Press Release, E.U. Requests WTO to Confirm No Justification, supra
note 7 (quoting E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy as stating that the E.U. had
"put in place revised legislation based on a thorough and independent scientific
risk assessment" and if the United States believed that the new legislation failed to
comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations, then the proper course of
action was to suspend its sanctions and bring the matter before the DSB, according
to the relevant rules of procedure).
93. See generally DSU, supra note 22, Annex 2, art. 3(7) (placing great
emphasis on the ability of Members to resolve disputes amongst themselves, but
establishing clear procedures for situations in which Members are not able to arrive
at a mutually agreeable understanding).
94. See Susana H. Puente, Section 301 and the New WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 213, 221-22 (1995) (suggesting that
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Similar to the E.C.-Hormones dispute, in U.S.-Certain E.C.
Products, the E.C. brought a claim against the United States for its
continued suspension of concessions against various European
imports.96 The DSB authorized the United States to suspend
concessions after the DSB concluded that certain E.C. measures were
inconsistent with its WTO obligations. 97 Importantly, the U.S.-
Certain E.C. Products Panel determined that the term 'redress'
suggests Member action taken in response to either a perceived
violation or an actual DSB-determined violation.98 The Panel
ultimately concluded that the United States acted inconsistently with
its WTO obligations when it failed to abide by the DSU and acted
unilaterally to redress a mere perceived violation.99
The U.S.-Section 301 Trade Act Panel further emphasized that
DSU Article 23.2(c) specifically includes a prohibition on Members
making unilateral determinations of inconsistency prior to exhausting
the requirements of Article 23.1 impose a "positive obligation" upon WTO
Members to utilize the DSU process to resolve disputes).
95. See Panel Report, United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
7.43, WT/DS 152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.-Section 301
Trade Act] (stating how Article 23.1 provides a "general duty of a dual nature,"
which grants Members recourse within the DSU's multilateral process when
seeking the "redress of a WTO inconsistency"). This general duty requires that the
Members make use of the DSU settlement system to the exclusion of all other
systems. Id.
96. See Panel Report, United States-Import Measures on Certain European
Community Products from the European Communities, 1 1.4, WT/DS165/R (July
17, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products] (indicating that
the E.C. brought the matter before the DSB because it alleged that the United
States unilaterally imposed greater sanctions against the E.C. than the arbitrators
had authorized).
97. See id. 1 2.16 (stating that the arbitrators gave the United States
authorization to suspend concessions on certain E.C. products in the amount of
$191.4 million per year).
98. See id. 6.22, 6.26 (concluding that the imposition of contingent liabilities
on certain imports constituted the imposition of debts on those imports, also
placing upon them obligations because the additional liabilities indicated that the
United States was "'seeking to redress,' what it perceived to be a WTO violation"
(emphasis added)).
99. See id. I 7.1(a), 7.1(b), 7.1(d) (holding that when the United States
initiated retaliatory measures it was seeking to "redress a WTO violation," which
therefore brought the measure within the scope of Article 23.1, which prohibits
unilateral action).
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DSU procedures. 100 There the E.C. brought a dispute before the DSB,
claiming that provisions in the United States Trade Act of 1974,
which provide for the possibility of U.S. unilateral action, were
inconsistent with the DSU. 1°1 Though the Panel concluded that the
language of Section 304 in particular was facially inconsistent with
the DSU, 10 2 the section did not constitute unilateral action because it
provided an exception for matters covered by the WTO.10 3
2. The DSB Grants Authorization to Suspend Concessions
for Temporary Purposes Only
Whether the DSB will consider a Member's actions to be
unilateral depends in part upon whether the DSB authorized the
action taken. 104 After the E.C. failed to comply with the DSB within
100. See Panel Report, U.S. -Certain E.C. Products, supra note 96, 6.37-6.38
(concluding that "suspension of concessions ... should be used as a last resort"
and may only be undertaken with authorization from the DSB).
101. See Panel Report, U.S. -Section 301 Trade Act, supra note 95, 2.1-2.10
(discussing the provisions of Sections 301(a) of the Trade Act, which include
language allowing the United States Trade Representative to take certain actions,
"subject to the specific directions ... of the President [of the United States]" in
situations where "'the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are
being denied' or violated). The Panel observed, however, that the Act also
provides that such action is unnecessary in the event of WTO involvement. Id.
2.4.
102. See id. 7.96 (remarking that the statutory language of the Trade Act
created a "real risk" for the trading community that the U.S. Trade Representative
would find inconsistencies with international trading agreements, which effectively
"removes the guarantee which Article 23 is intended to give"). Such action is
prohibited under Article 23.2(a) of the DSU and thus inconsistent with the DSU
itself. Id.
103. See id. 7.108 (stating that the Trade Act provides a measure of
administrative discretion in that the U.S. Trade Representative is limited in the
case of situations covered by the WTO to acting only after the completion of DSU
proceedings).
104. See Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, supra note 96, 6.86
(concluding that the United States acted unilaterally when it imposed an increased
bonding requirement on certain E.C. imports because the United States did not
receive authorization through the DSU process to suspend concessions for any
alleged WTO violation on the part of the E.C.).
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a reasonable period of time, 105 the DSB granted the United States
authorization to suspend concessions on the importation of certain
E.C. goods and apply tariffs at 100 percent ad valorem, up to $116.8
million per year. 10 6 Under DSU Article 22.8, the suspension of
concessions is a temporary measure, and lasts only as long as the
offending Member fails to comply with the DSB rulings. 107 The E.C.
asserts that once the offending Member brings its measure into
compliance, DSU Article 21.5 requires the non-offending Member to
submit questions as to the measure's compliance to the WTO dispute
settlement process.10 8
The United States maintains there is no distinction between the
two E.C. measures and therefore it is not bound by Article 21.5 to
resort to the DSB. 10 9 The E.C. claims that Directives 96/22/EC and
105. See supra note 87 (discussing the determination of the arbitrators to set the
reasonable period of time at fifteen months for the E.C.'s compliance with the
rulings and recommendations of the DSB).
106. See Decision by the Arbitrators, Hormones, supra note 86, 45-78, 84
(estimating the nullification and impairment caused by the ban on importation of
U.S. high quality beef to be $32,664,776 and nullification from the ban on the
importation of edible beef offal to be $84,095,731 and concluding that an award of
$116.8 million is consistent with Article 22.4 of the DSU); see also DSU, supra
note 22, art. 22.4 ("The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations
authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or
impairment.").
107. See Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 6.3, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9,
1999) (reiterating the purpose of allowing the suspension of concessions is to
motivate the offending Member to comply with the DSB and emphasizing that the
authority to take unilateral action is removed once the Member achieves
compliance).
108. See Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation
of Civil Aircraft, 36, WT/DS70/AB/RW (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate
Report, Canada-Civil Aircraft] (concluding that Article 21.5 does not apply to all
measures, but is specific to "measures taken to comply" with the DSB's
recommendations). Article 21.5 assumes that there is a distinction between the
original measure found inconsistent, and the "measure taken to comply." Id.
109. See Nov. 7, 2003 DSB Meeting Minutes, supra note 80, 29-30
(reiterating that several studies produced by the E.C. over the years showed no risk
of adverse health effects from the consumption of residues from growth hormones
and that despite this evidence, the E.C. still maintains its unjustified ban, albeit
under a new label).
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2003/74/EC are separate and distinct, and thus any dispute must be
brought before the DSB.°10
II. ANALYSIS
The E.C. can comply with the DSB's rulings and
recommendations by demonstrating that a valid risk assessment
supports the new Directive."' Because the E.C. is able to do so, the
DSB will likely conclude that the Directive is consistent with the
SPS Agreement.' However, regardless of the DSB's determination,
the United States acted unilaterally by maintaining the suspension of
concessions after the E.C. notified the United States of the new
Directive." 3 Thus, the DSB will likely find that this action is
inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the DSU.14
A. DIRECTIVE 2003/74/EC BRINGS THE E.C. HORMONE MEASURES
INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ITS WTO OBLIGATIONS
The Appellate Body did not mandate that the E.C. adopt a
substantive change in policy." 5 In fact, Directive 2003/74/EC does
little to substantively reformulate the prior E.C. hormone
110. See id. 28 (noting that the DSB invalidated Directive 96/22/EC on the
basis that it lacked a proper assessment of the risks and stating that the new
Directive is fully supported by "a risk assessment performed by an independent
scientific committee").
111. See discussion supra Part I.B (describing the requirements for a valid risk
assessment).
112. See discussion infra Part II.A.
113. See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining that the determination of whether
a Member acted unilaterally does not depend upon whether the Member's
conclusions are ultimately correct).
114. See discussion infra Part II.B (arguing that the United States should have
immediately brought the matter before the WTO upon notification from the E.C.
that the new Directive brought the E.C. into compliance with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB).
115. See Appellate Report, E.C.-Hormones, supra note 22, 177, 208
(concluding that the E.C. measures in dispute were only invalid because the
procedures used to support them were inconsistent with the requirements of
Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement).
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measures." 6 The United States argues the mere fact that the E.C.
policy remains unchanged is sufficient to conclude that the E.C.
remains in violation of its obligations under the SPS Agreement and,
therefore, has not brought its measures into compliance with the
DSB. 117 However, the United States misinterprets the actual DSB
rulings and recommendations in making this assertion.IIs
Nowhere within the Panel, Appellate, or even Arbitration Body
rulings and recommendations did the DSB conclude that the E.C.
must withdraw its SPS measures to comply with the DSB. 119 Rather,
each body stated that the "[DSB] requests the European
Communities to bring its measures in dispute into conformity with
its obligations [under the SPS Agreement] .' 120 Therefore, compliance
116. See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, EC Beef
Hormone Dispute Drags On, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Nov. 13,
2003, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-11-13/story3.htm (observing
that the new E.C. directive actually maintains the prohibition against five of the
cited hormones). The E.C. asserts that it was maintaining the prohibition on the
five hormones on a provisional basis because there was a potential threat to human
health and the available scientific evidence was not sufficient to discount that
potential. Id.; see also E.C. Communication 22, supra note 80, at 1-2 (informing
the WTO and the United States that in adopting Directive 2003/74/EC, the E.C.
considered itself in compliance with the DSB ruling, and accordingly sought the
end of the U.S. suspension of concessions).
117. See Nov. 7, 2003 DSB Meeting Minutes, supra note 80, 29-30.
118. See Erin N. Palmer, Comment, The World Trade Organization Slips Up: A
Critique of the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Understanding
Through the European Union Banana Dispute, 69 TENN. L. REv. 443, 470 (2002)
(proposing that if the Appellate Body has specific suggestions on how a Member
may bring its measures into compliance, the Body must make those
recommendations known to the Member, otherwise the Body may only request that
the Member bring its measures into compliance with the agreement at issue).
119. See Award of the Arbitrator, supra note 87, 32 (indicating the E.C. and
the United States feel differently as to what constitutes compliance with the DSB).
The E.C. believes that conducting scientific risk assessments are a "'necessary first
step' to bringing the E.C. measures into conformity," while the United States
stated that conducting these risk assessments were "the only means of bringing [the
E.C.] into conformity." Id. (emphasis in original).
120. Id. 38 (acknowledging that while withdrawing an inconsistent measure is
often the preferred method of compliance, it is not the only method).
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in this case requires a mere showing that a valid risk assessment
supports the E.C. SPS measures. 21
Because the E.C. supports its new Directive with a valid risk
assessment, as demonstrated below, the E.C. has in fact brought its
measures into compliance with the DSB rulings and
recommendations. Therefore, the E.C. may maintain its policy of
banning the use of growth hormones in the production of meat and
continue prohibiting the importation of such products, even though
the Directive continues to set a level of sanitary protection higher
than international standards. 1 2
1. The E.C. Supports the Implementation of Its SPS Measures Under
Council Directive 2003/74/EC with a Valid Risk Assessment
a. The Risk Assessment Specifically Identifies the Risk
that the Directive Is Employed to Combat
As a threshold matter, the DSB unequivocally equates the
presence of growth hormone residues in meat with the meaning of
contaminants under the SPS Agreement's definition of a risk
assessment. 123 Admittedly, the 1999 SCVPH Report concluded that
humans would be exposed to all of the naturally-occurring hormones
prohibited by the E.C. measures even if they ate only untreated
meat."2 4 The United States seizes upon this information, as it did in
121. See discussion supra Part II.A.1-3 (demonstrating that the DSB requires
only that Members base their SPS measures on a valid risk assessment and rejects
the idea that such measures must follow the general scientific trend).
122. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 3.3 (providing that measures not
based on international standards must be supported by sufficient scientific
evidence). See generally Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS
Agreement of the World Trade Organization and International Organizations: The
Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection
Convention, and the International Office of Epozootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 27, 28-30 (1998) (reviewing the international organizations upon which the
DSB relies when determining what international standards it will apply in
evaluating Members' SPS measures).
123. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13, Annex A, 4 (defining one version of
risk assessment as an evaluation of the "presence of additives, contaminants, toxins
or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs").
124. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 27 (emphasizing that while the
natural hormones are found in cattle and thus humans would consume these
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the initial hormones dispute, to argue that such evidence clearly
demonstrates that hormone residues are not contaminants. 125
However, this argument fails to properly acknowledge the fact that
the 1999 SCVPH Report also concluded that the use of growth-
promoting hormones in meats does in fact result in increased
exposure to residues from even naturally-occurring hormones.1 26
Furthermore, the report indicates that the increased level of exposure
to these hormone residues is greater among certain individual
consumers and varies among the individual hormones. 127
Finally, the U.S.' argument is unpersuasive because there is
logically no opportunity for humans to be naturally exposed to the
synthetic hormones prohibited by the E.C. measures. 128 The presence
of residues from such hormones is a complete contaminant under any
evaluation, and as such, presents an increased risk of exposure from
the consumption of treated meat. 129
Thus, the risk assessment meets the initial requirement of risk
identification, including a risk from naturally-occurring hormones,
by identifying the presence of contaminants in the form of growth
hormones through eating even untreated meat, humans are not normally exposed to
synthetic hormones, which must be added to feed for humans to face such
exposure).
125. See GAN REPORT I, supra note 89, at 2 (asserting that a "true state of the
art risk assessment" would show that the level of Oestradiol is greater in eggs and
other dairy products than it is in beef, regardless of whether the beef has been
treated or not).
126. 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 28.
127. See id. at 28-30 (noting that because some of the hormones in dispute occur
naturally in males and females, and can vary according to age and stage of physical
development, the increased exposure to residues will result in different
physiological effects and resulting health implications).
128. See id. at 27 (concluding that an assessment of a risk of increased exposure
to residues of the hormones in question must begin with the knowledge that
residues from naturally-occurring hormones will be found naturally in humans at
some level above zero and residues from synthetic hormones should be found in
humans naturally at a level of zero).
129. See Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement: The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L
L. 89, 97 (1998) (stating that the synthetic hormones act in a manner that is
"basically similar to 'natural' hormones . . . but possess slightly different
molecular structures").
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hormone residues. 3 ° Therefore, the DSB must reject the U.S.
argument and conclude that the E.C. presents sufficient evidence
indicating a risk of increased exposure to a contaminant within the
meaning of a risk assessment under the SPS Agreement. 3 '
b. The Risk Assessment Identifies Adverse Effects from the
Increased Exposure to Hormone Residues in Meats
Treated with Growth-Promoting Hormones
Contrary to U.S. assertions, the E.C.'s risk assessment complies
with the first requirement of adverse effects identification by
identifying the possibility of several adverse developmental,
immunological, neurobiological, immunotoxic, genotoxic, and
carcinogenic effects on human health resulting from the consumption
of meat containing residues from growth-promoting hormones.'32
Confronted with this evidence the United States blindly asserts that
the risk assessment does not rectify the errors of the previous risk
assessment.'3 3 This is a baseless attack that ignores the data
contained in the SCVPH reports that demonstrate a risk to humans
from the increased exposure to hormone residues.'34 For example, the
SCVPH concluded that "the pubertal growth spurt [in children] of
both sexes is driven by Oestradiol [173]. '' 3 Consequently, there is
130. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining the biological nature
of the individual hormones and the purpose of their use).
131. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (observing the Panel Body's
determination that residues from growth-promoting hormones constitute
contaminants within the meaning of the SPS agreement).
132. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 73 (finding a risk from the
consumption of beef treated with growth-promoting hormones, identifying in
particular Oestradiol 17]3 as posing the greatest risk to human health).
133. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. refusal
to withdraw its DSB-authorized suspension of concessions despite the E.C.'s
assertion that it is now in compliance with the DSB's rulings and
recommendations).
134. But see GLOBAL AGRICULTURE INFORMATION NETWORK, USDA FOREIGN
AGRICULTURE SERVICE, GAIN REPORT No. E23217, EUROPEAN UNION TRADE
MONITORING: E.U. PRESENTATION ON HORMONE BAN DIRECTIVE (2003/74/EC), 2
(2003), http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200311/145986807.pdf [hereinafter
GAIN REPORT II] (emphasizing that a U.K. study refuted the findings and
conclusions of the SCVPH Report).
135. 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 43.
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strong evidence that increased exposure to this hormone, "even... at
very low doses," can alter children's growth and lead to an early
onset of puberty.136 Therefore, even if the United States is correct to
assume that the level of increased exposure is not overwhelming, 3 7
the evidence shows that minimal increases can lead to serious
adverse effects.138 In light of the SCVPH findings, the DSB can only
come to the conclusion that the E.C. risk assessment identifies
adverse health effects from the increased exposure to growth
hormone residues. 139
Furthermore, by identifying particular risks to human health, the
present risk assessment overcomes the deficiencies of the risk
assessment that the Panel and Appellate Body in E.C.-Hormones
declared invalid. 40 The previous risk assessment failed to properly
identify particular adverse effects on human health from the
consumption of hormone-treated meats.' Rather, the cited studies
from the purported risk assessment in the initial dispute made general
136. See id.
137. See U.S. Interagency Task Force on Beef Hormones, A Primer on Beef
Hormones (Feb. 22, 1999), http://www.useu.be/issues/BeefPrimer022699.html
(asserting that a boy would have to eat sixteen pounds of beef daily to increase his
exposure to Oestradiol 17P by one percent).
138. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON VETERINARY
MEASURES RELATING TO PUBLIC HEALTH, REVIEW OF PREVIOUS SCVPH OPINIONS
OF 30 APRIL 1999 AND 3 MAY 2000 ON THE POTENTIAL RISKS TO HUMAN HEALTH
FROM HORMONE RESIDUES IN BOVINE MEAT AND MEAT PRODUCTS 19-20 (Apr. 10,
2002) [hereinafter 2002 SCVPH REPORT] (concluding that the risks resulting from
exposure to hormones is greater if the exposure is early in life). This is a special
concern considering that the three synthetic hormones referenced in the study
readily pass through the placental barrier and accumulate in fetal tissue. Id.
139. See infra note 146 (describing the DSB's consideration of sufficient
scientific evidence as the key element of a valid risk assessment, not whether the
assessment comes to the same conclusion as the general scientific community).
140. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (recounting the Panel and
Appellate Bodies' determination that the E.C. failed to demonstrate a valid risk
assessment that identified a risk to human health from the consumption of meat
treated with growth-promoting hormones).
141. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the Appellate Body's
determination that the E.C.'s cited studies evaluated merely the risk posed by the
consumption of growth-promoting hormones and not the specific risk posed by the
consumption residues of such hormones found in meat).
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conclusions regarding the safety of growth hormones.1 42 In contrast,
the SCVPH reports identify several specific potential adverse effects
on human health from such consumption.143
Although the United States frequently cites scientific studies that
conclude there is no risk of adverse health effects, the existence of
these reports does not control the validity of the present risk
assessment. 144 As an initial consideration, many of these reports
predate the SCVPH reports, demonstrating that the E.C. risk
assessment used the latest scientific information.1 45 Moreover, the
E.C. is not bound by such reports, but is legally justified in accepting
a divergent opinion so long as it is based on sufficient scientific
evidence. 146
142. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 196-97
(concluding that the general studies that the E.C. cited did not meet the necessary
requirements of a valid risk assessment).
143. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (discussing the specific
adverse health affects identified by the SCVPH report, including the impact of
these hormones on height and puberty).
144. See David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the
World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 865, 879-80 (2000) (urging that the SPS Agreement does not seek
Member's harmonization of their measures directly to the current common
international standard, but rather imposes a duty that Member's not act arbitrarily
when instituting such measures and base them on sufficient scientific evidence).
145. See USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURE SERVICE, U.S. MISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION, WTO HORMONE CASE (2004), http://www.useu.be/
agri/ban.html#Opinion [hereinafter WTO HORMONE CASE] (referring to reports by
the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives and other international
groups concluding that the use of growth hormones in meat production poses no
risk of adverse health effects to humans). The committee produced the latest of
these cited reports in March 1999, prior to the first published report of the SCVPH.
Id. But see GAIN REPORT II, supra note 134, at 2 (citing one study from the U.K.
Veterinary Products Committee, published in October 1999-after the 1999
SCVPH Report-which also concluded that the usage of growth-promoting
hormones in the production of beef posed no threat of adverse health effects for
humans).
146. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 194 (emphasizing
that Article 5.1 does not require following the opinions of the prevailing scientific
view). Rather, the Appellate Body concluded that Article 5.1 merely requires
sufficient scientific evidence, and divergent views may simply be an indication of
a lack of a complete body of knowledge in a particular area. Id.
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Additionally, the DSB will not accept the U.S. argument that the
SCVPH was unduly biased.1 47 The DSB mandates only that the body
conducting the risk assessment adhere to generally accepted
scientific methods of evaluation and acknowledge all of the available
scientific evidence. 4 The DSB does not require the risk assessment
to blindly accept the conclusions of other studies,1 49 nor does it
mandate that the body conducting the study be independent from the
Member seeking the study. 150
The SCVPH reports meet the DSB requirements by (1) evaluating
both basic traditional scientific principles of the hormones and also
emerging concerns over how those hormones interact with human
biology, taking into consideration non-scientifically quantifiable
measures; 5 ' and (2) reviewing findings and studies from other
scientific bodies as they become available in an effort to continually
evaluate the SCVPH's conclusions. 15 2 The E.C. risk assessment is
valid even if the SCVPH's process diverged from a strictly
traditional methodology because the SPS Agreement specifically
147. See GAIN REPORT II, supra note 134, at 2 (alluding to the idea that because
the committee that reviewed the findings of the U.K. Veterinary Products
Committee in relation to the previous findings of the SCPVH had been virtually
the same composition as the committee that created the initial SCPVH report, it
was somehow unduly biased in concluding that the previous findings of the
SCVPH were still valid).
148. See supra note 44 (summarizing the Appellate Body's determination that a
Member's consideration of the available scientific evidence may be balanced with
a Member's consideration of other non-scientific elements).
149. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 194 (concluding that
a valid risk assessment may consider the prevailing scientific view while at the
same time arriving at a different conclusion).
150. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the Appellate Body's
conclusions that a Member is not required to undertake its own risk assessment or
be wholly independent from the body conducting the assessment, and that an
assessment conducted under either scenario may hold equal weight).
151. See 2002 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 138, at 8 (acknowledging that while
this approach is different from a traditional approach to risk assessment, the DSB
endorsed the procedure by concluding that risk assessments may consider risks as
they would occur in the real world and not just within the laboratory).
152. See id. at 6-7 (stating that the purpose of the 2002 report was to revisit the
findings of the 1999 report in light of seventeen studies commissioned by the E.C.
and other recent scientific data provided by various international scientific bodies
and to determine the current state of understanding on the adverse effects of
growth hormones on human health).
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allows for this type of flexibility among its Members. 153 Because the
SCVPH's process adheres to the DSB-articulated methodology
principles, the DSB will likely conclude that the risk assessment, as
conducted, is valid and the E.C. may base its SPS measures on the
SCVPH reports alone.' 54
c. The Risk Assessment Evaluates the Potential for
Adverse Effects on Human Health to Occur
The risk assessment also meets the second element of the adverse
effects identification requirement because it evaluates the potential
for occurrence of the identified adverse effects from increased
consumption of residues from the targeted growth hormones.'55 For
example, among the adverse effects that the SCVPH reports
envisage, in utero exposure to hormone residues is one of the
greatest areas of concern, as the reports show a link between
exposure and adverse pre-pubertal development, as well as future
development of cancer in adulthood.'56 Therefore, the reports not
only clearly establish that cancer is an identifiable adverse effect,
they also establish an identifiable potential that increased exposure to
hormone residues will produce this adverse effect.'57
153. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 129 (noting that the
SPS Agreement grants "a certain degree of flexibility" to Members in meeting
their Article 5.1 obligations, by allowing risk assessments to be conducted "as
appropriate to circumstances").
154. See id. 187 (emphasizing that an evaluation of the available scientific
evidence is merely the beginning of the overall objective of a valid risk
assessment); see also discussion infra Part II.A.2 (arguing that the E.C. SPS
measures are rationally and objectively related to the conclusions of the SCPVH
reports and thus based on the E.C. risk assessment).
155. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 198 (affirming the
Panel's conclusion that the risk assessment that the E.C. offered to support Council
Directive 96/22/EC failed to evaluate the potentiality of occurrence of the specified
risk because the studies relied upon did not focus on the particular risk potential
resulting from the consumption of residues of the hormones administered to
animals intended for consumption).
156. See 2002 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 138, at 20 (summarizing three
studies of female twins with male co-twins that found that increased exposure to
estrogen in utero has a significant influence on the development of cancer in
adulthood).
157. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (reviewing the DSB's
determination that the E.C. failed to meet the specificity requirement in the initial
255
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While the United States cites the fact that the reports themselves
do not set forth a quantifiable level of risk for the hormones at
issue,'58 the DSB does not require the risk assessment to delineate
such a quantifiable risk. 15 9 Rather, a Member meets its burden by
showing that adverse effects are possible. 6 ° The SCVPH reports
definitively conclude a possibility of adverse effects on human health
from growth hormone residues exists, 16 1 despite the inability to
provide quantitative measures of those risks. 62 Therefore, unlike in
the initial hormone dispute, the U.S. argument will likely fail to
persuade the DSB that the risk assessment does not meet the second
element of risk identification.
d. The Risk Assessment Is Specific to the Effects Caused by Increased
Exposure to Growth Hormone Residues Through the
Consumption of Treated Meats
Unlike the first E. C.-Hormones risk assessment and Japan's risk
assessment in Japan-Apples, the risk assessment that supports
Council Directive 2003/74/EC is specific to the adverse effects the
E.C.-Hormones dispute because the evidence the E.C. cited failed to specifically
address the risk posed by the consumption of hormone residues).
158. See Press Release, Senate Comm. on Finance, Senator Chuck Grassley,
European Announcements on Hormone-Treated Beef (Oct. 15, 2003),
http://www.useu.be/Categories/BeefHormones/Grassleyprg 101503.pdf [hereinafter
Press Release, Grassley] (alleging that the E.C. still does not have the support of
scientific evidence indicating a risk posed by the hormones other than Oestradiol
173, yet maintains its unlawful ban on hormone-treated beef); see also 1999
SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 73 (acknowledging that "the current state of
[scientific] knowledge does not allow [for] a quantitative estimate of risk").
159. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 186 (rejecting the
Panel's implication that a risk assessment must establish a "minimum magnitude
of risk").
160. See supra note 32 (explaining the Appellate Body's rejection of the Panel's
conclusion that adverse potential identification requires a showing that the adverse
effects are probable).
161. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 70-71, 73 (identifying possible
"endocrine, developmental, immunological, neurobiological, immunotoxic,
genotoxic and carcinogenic effects" and specifically determining that there is a
possible link between consumption of treated meat and prostate and breast cancer).
162. See id. at 72 (noting that the primary reason that the committee is unable to
determine a quantifiable risk is the general lack of understanding of "critical
development periods in human life").
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Directive seeks to avoid and the potential for those effects to
occur.
163 Remedying the previous failure, the new risk assessment
specifically evaluates the risk posed to human health by the
consumption of meats contaminated with growth hormone
residues. 16 In conducting its evaluation the SCVPH examined (1) the
level of residues humans would typically be exposed to through
consuming treated meats; (2) what effect such exposure by itself
would have upon human health; and (3) what adverse effects the
exposure would have upon human health when considered in
conjunction with other normal human environmental factors. 165
Thus, in addition to identifying a risk of adverse effects on human
health and the potential for those effects to occur, the assessment is
valid because it is also specific to both the covered hormones and to
the precise mode of exposure. 166 Because the risk assessment fulfills
the requirements of adverse effects identification and meets the
additional specificity requirement, the DSB will find that the E.C.
has met its burden of demonstrating the existence of a valid risk
assessment. 1
67
163. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 200 (rejecting the
idea that the E.C.'s cited studies should be considered valid risk assessments
because they failed to address the specific risks identified by the E.C.).
164. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 1 (identifying the mandate of
this report by the committee as evaluating "the potential for adverse effects" from
the consumption of residues from growth hormones used in meats). The mandate
specifically identifies the hormones evaluated in the study as Oestradiol 17p,
progesterone, testosterone, Zeranol, trenbolone acetate, and melengestrol acetate.
Id.
165. See id. at 1-3.
166. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of
a specificity requirement under the SPS Agreement and the relevant body of WTO
case law interpreting the SPS Agreement).
167. See discussion supra Part I.B (outlining the requirements of a valid risk
assessment and the specific elements of adverse risk identification); see also
discussion supra Part I.C (asserting that once a Member demonstrates the existence
of a valid risk assessment, the DSB will find the Member's SPS measures valid so
long as the Member is able to demonstrate that the measures are based on the risk
assessment).
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2. Council Directive 2003/74/EC is Rationally Related
to Its Supporting Risk Assessment
The SPS measures are based on a valid risk assessment because
there is a rational and objective relationship between the measures
and the assessment. 6 8 The United States maintains there is no
objective or rational relationship because the E.C. is unable to
support its SPS measures with .evidence of sufficient quantifiable
risks to human health. 169 Contrary to U.S. assertions, neither the SPS
Agreement, nor the DSB, requires the E.C. to show a certain
minimum degree of risk within its risk assessment to establish valid
SPS measures. 70 Rather, the SPS measures meet the SPS Agreement
and DSB requirements so long as the E.C. demonstrates a rational
and objective relationship between the measures and the risk
assessment.' 7
Council Directive 2003/74/EC demonstrates an objective and
rational relationship between the SCVPH reports' findings and
conclusions and the SPS Measure, an accomplishment that neither
Directive 96/22/EC nor the Japanese varietal testing requirement
could achieve. 72 The 1999 SCVPH Report found that a risk of
168. See discussion supra Part I.C (noting that in addition to the existence of a
valid risk assessment, the DSB also requires a rational and objective relationship
between the risk assessment and the Member's SPS measures).
169. See WTO HORMONE CASE, supra note 145 (commenting on the E.C.'s
failure to adequately rebut the modem body of knowledge developed by the
international scientific community, which concludes that the use of growth
hormones in meat production presents no risk of adverse health effects to human
consumers).
170. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 186 (criticizing the
Panel Report, which in one part acknowledged that an "identifiable risk" can never
be proven to a certainty while in another part indicated that a certain threshold
level of risk should be demonstrated to show that a SPS measure is consistent with
Article 5.1); see also supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the
absence of a requirement of a minimum quantifiable risk under the SPS
Agreement).
171. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (observing the lack of a rational
and objective relationship between the E.C. hormone measures and the risk
assessment in the initial E.C.-Hormones dispute).
172. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 197 (affirming the
Panel's determination that the risk assessment could not "rationally support" the
E.C. measures, especially when considering the "difficulty raised by the Panel's
use of the term 'identifiable risk"'); see also Panel Report, Japan-Agriculture
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increased exposure to residues from growth hormones exists through
the consumption of treated meats. 173 The Report further determined
that this increase results in exposure beyond normal levels. 174 The
Report finally concluded that this increased exposure beyond normal
levels has the potential to result in adverse effects on human
health. 75 A multitude of studies contained within all three SCVPH
reports, including studies from various international scientific bodies,
support these findings and conclusions, thus meeting the "sufficient
scientific evidence" requirement to establish a rational and objective
link between hormone residue exposure and adverse health effects. 1
76
By prohibiting the use of the disputed growth hormones in meats
intended for human consumption, and preventing the importation of
such meats, Council Directive 2003/74/EC is rationally and
objectively related to the valid supporting risk assessment.1 77 The
goal of the Directive is to prevent adverse health effects by
preventing the increased exposure to hormone residues. Eliminating
the presence of the hormone residues from consumable meats will
necessarily prevent this type of increased exposure. Accordingly, the
DSB must conclude that the new Directive is consistent with E.C.
obligations under the SPS Agreement.
Products, supra note 41, 8.42 (finding that the United States offered sufficient
evidence for the panel to conclude that there was never an instance where a
treatment for one variety of a certain agricultural product had to be modified in
order to be effective on another variety of the same product, thus contradicting a
rational relationship between Japan's measures and its purported risk assessment).
173. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 36, 47, 52, 57, 63-64, 67.
174. See id. (discussing the levels of increased exposure presented by each of
the hormones in dispute).
175. See supra notes 132-49 and accompanying text (describing the various
possibilities of adverse health effects and emphasizing a particular risk to pre-
pubertal children posed by the increased level of exposure to growth hormone
residues from the consumption of treated meats).
176. See Appellate Report, Japan-Agricultural Products, supra note 40, 73
(maintaining that "sufficiency" merely requires a showing that there is an
"adequate relationship" between the scientific evidence and the risk assessment).
177. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 11-12 (recognizing that
while there is a risk posed to human health from the increased exposure to residues
from growth-promoting hormones in consumable meats, especially in light of the
potential for the misuse of such hormones, there are certain legitimate uses for
these hormones other than for growth promotion that should continue to be
authorized, though only for well-defined purposes and under strict supervision).
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3. The E. C. SPS Measures Are Valid Even Without a
Demonstration of Sufficient Scientific Evidence
Perhaps the one weakness in the E.C.'s argument is the fact that
the SCVPH reports do not quantify the risk adverse effects.'78 The
reports state that there is insufficient data, though several adverse
effects "could be envisaged." 17 9 The United States argues that this
fact alone should render the Directive inconsistent with the
requirements of a valid risk assessment because the scientific
evidence does not rationally support the measures. 180 However, the
lack of knowledge or data does not automatically lead to the DSB
invalidating the Directive."' Rather, Article 5.7 of the SPS
Agreement specifically allows for situations such as this, in which
the scientific data is not fully developed to allow for a full conclusion
on the level of risk posed to human health.182
In the initial E.C.-Hormones dispute, the E.C. never invoked
Article 5.7 to support Council Directive 96/22/EC. 183 However, the
manner in which the E.C. enacted Council Directive 2003/74/EC
178. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting the U.S. assertion that a
lack of quantifiable risk negates the validity of the Directive).
179. See 1999 SCVPH REPORT, supra note 16, at 73 (concluding that the report
identifies a risk to consumer health "with different levels of conclusive evidence,"
but the current state of knowledge and the data available do not "allow for a
quantitative estimate of the risk").
180. See WTO HORMONE CASE, supra note 145, at 2 (stating that the E.C.'s
justification relies only on the findings of the SCVPH Report regarding the
potential for adverse health effects posed by Oestradiol 1713 alone and does not
substantially discuss the effects of the other hormones at issue).
181. See Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based
Approach to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 329,
388-89 (2002) (commenting on the so-called "precautionary principle" as
embodied in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement and explaining that positive action,
like a ban on particular products, may occur before a risk is scientifically
established).
182. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Article 5.7 of
the SPS Agreement allows Members to provisionally adopt SPS measures in these
situations).
183. See Panel Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 21, 8.249.
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leads to the conclusion that it has considered possible invocation of
Article 5.7 to support the validity of the Directive.184
Though the United States claims that the provisional nature of the
prohibition only supports its assertions of invalidity, 8 5 the DSB
should find that Council Directive 2003/74/EC meets all four
requirements necessary to invoke Article 5.7.186 First, the E.C.
imposed the Directive where the scientific information was
insufficient.'87 Second, the E.C. adopted the Directive based on the
pertinent information contained within the 1999 SCVPH Report and
two follow-up reports, 188 both of which affirmed the conclusions of
the first report. 89 The E.C. also meets the third requirement, as the
184. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, art. 1(1) (implying that the
provisions contained within the Directive banning certain substances may be
applied on a provisional basis). However, the provisional nature of the Directive
does not apply to the prohibition on Oestradiol 1713, the restriction of which is
actually increased with the aim of terminating all use by October 14, 2006. Id. art.
1(1), 1(4).
185. See GAIN REPORT I, supra note 89, at 2 (concluding that the 'provisional'
nature of the new growth hormone ban in the 2003 Directive provides no
justification for the DSB to consider the ban valid because there is no real change
in the status of the banned hormones from the 1996 Directive).
186. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements that a
Member must meet to comply with Article 5.7 and emphasizing that each of the
requirements must be met for the Member's SPS measure to be consistent with
Article 5.7's mandate).
187. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of the
SCVPH report to come to a full conclusion as to the risks associated with the
hormones due to a lack of current scientific knowledge); see also 1999 SCVPH
REPORT, supra note 16, at 72-73 (concluding that despite not being able to identify
a quantitative level of risk, the 1999 SCVPH Report does in fact identify the
potential for adverse effects to human health posed by all of the six disputed
hormones).
188. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 5-8 (outlining the studies
that the E.C. relied on to support the new Directive, which supported the original
hypothesis of the 1999 Report).
189. See id. 8 (suggesting that the two follow-up SCVPH reports were
influenced in part by the U.K. Veterinary Products Committee's findings in a 1999
report, which, along with two other contemporaneous reports, provided more
scientific information to be included in the SCVPH's evaluation of the risk posed
by growth hormone residues). The SCVPH noted the findings of three major
committees, including the U.K. Veterinary Products Committee, and concluded
that they did not provide convincing evidence sufficient to warrant changing the
1999 SCVPH Report's conclusions. Id. The SCVPH affirmed this determination
again in 2002. Id.
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follow-up reports indicate that the E.C. continues to search for
available scientific evidence to allow for a more objective risk
assessment.190 Furthermore, unlike Japan in Japan-Agricultural
Products 11,191 the E.C. seeks information directly relevant to the
validity of maintaining its SPS measure.192 Finally, unlike the
provision in Australia-Salmon that Australia had in place for more
than twenty years,1 93 the E.C. reviews the efficacy of its provisions
every couple of years, allowing for enough time in between reviews
for pertinent scientific developments, without ignoring its
responsibilities to the international community. 94
Therefore, even if the DSB concludes that the E.C. maintains the
SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence, the DSB will
find that the E.C.'s SPS measures meet the four requirements to
establish the Directive's validity under Article 5.7.195
190. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (indicating the E.C.'s
willingness to review its measures and modify them accordingly, as it required the
SCPVH to review its original 1999 report twice).
191. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the Panel and
Appellate Body determinations that Japan failed to meet the requirements of
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement by not continuing to review its SPS measures
through relevant scientific evidence to produce a more objective risk assessment).
192. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON VETERINARY
MEASURES RELATING TO PUBLIC HEALTH, REVIEW OF SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE SCVPH OPINION OF 30 APRIL 99 ON THE POTENTIAL RISKS TO
HUMAN HEALTH FROM HORMONE RESIDUES IN BOVINE MEAT AND MEAT
PRODUCTS 2-3 (2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/chemicalsafety/
contaminants/hormones/sciopinionen.htm [hereinafter 2000 SCVPH REPORT]
(commenting that the SCVPH undertook this review primarily based on the U.K.
Veterinary Products Committee's findings regarding the use of Oestradiol 170 in
cattle for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes, which showed a "lack of
correlation" between the use of such hormones and "carcinogenic potencies").
193. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing the DSB's
rejection of Australia's ability to assert that the measure at issue, which had been
in place for two decades, was provisional and thus within the scope of Article 5.7).
194. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 8, 10 (indicating that the
SCVPH conducted the relevant studies and reviews in 2000 and 2002 and will
continue to evaluate "more complete scientific information from any source" that
will allow the E.C. to draw full conclusions on the safety of the individual
hormones).
195. See discussion supra Part I.D (observing that SPS measures lacking the
support of sufficient scientific evidence are valid under certain situations as
governed by Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement).
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B. THE ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTES
UNILATERAL ACTION INCONSISTENT WITH ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
The U.S. refusal to withdraw the suspension of concessions is
fueled by its misperception of the new Directive as fundamentally
the same as the previous invalidated Directive. 96 The DSB will
ultimately find this constitutes unilateral action under the DSU,
because (1) Council Directive 2003/74/EC is a "measure taken to
comply" with the DSB rulings and recommendations and (2) the U.S.
action is meant to redress the existence or inconsistency of that
measure. 197
The United States must abide by DSU rules and procedures if the
Directive constitutes a new measure that the E.C. took to comply
with the DSB. 198 However, the United States vigorously maintains
that because the E.C. policy remains unchanged the Directive is not a
new measure, but one the DSB has already considered and
determined to be invalid. 199
It is possible the DSB might conclude that the new Directive is not
distinct from the measures deemed inconsistent with WTO
obligations, °° which led to the Arbitration Panel's authorization for
196. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the E.C.'s
notification of compliance to the DSB and the United States in October 2003 and
the U.S. reaction to the notification).
197. See discussion supra Part I.F. 1 (explaining the prohibition under the DSU
against Members acting unilaterally in resolving disputes with other WTO
Members).
198. See DSU, supra note 22, art. 22.8 (providing that the suspension of
concessions is intended as a temporary measure and must be terminated upon
compliance by the offending Member).
199. See GAIN REPORT II, supra note 134, at 3 (conveying the U.S. belief that
the E.C. has not presented a "new risk assessment based on scientific information
and reasoning" that would warrant the consideration of the Directive as a measure
taken to comply with the DSB's prior ruling).
200. See DSU, supra note 22, art. 22.8 (providing that the suspension of
concessions may continue where a measure has not been removed, DSB
recommendations or rulings have not been implemented, or a "mutually
satisfactory solution" has not been reached); see also supra notes 82, 89 and
accompanying text (recounting the U.S. belief that E.C. Directive 2003/74/EC was
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the initial suspension of concessions.2 °1 In this situation, the United
States would be well within its right to maintain the suspension of
concessions, as the WTO would have already determined a
violation.2 2
However, the evidence in this case makes clear that the temporary
suspension of concessions must end because the suspension no
longer has legitimate DSB authorization, as the DSB has not yet
ruled on the validity of the new Directive.0 3 In this situation, DSU
Article 23 requires the United States to seek recourse through the
dispute settlement process exclusively.2°4 Without such recourse the
alleged violation remains merely perceived, not DSB-determined,
and the DSB will consider the U.S. response as unilateral.2 5
not a new measure that warranted treatment as a measure enacted to comply with
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB).
201. See Decision by the Arbitrators, Hormones, supra note 86, 83-84
(indicating that after reviewing the relevant submissions, the arbitration panel
determined that the appropriate level of suspension of concessions in consideration
of the E.C. measures involved would be $116.8 million per year). See generally
Request by the European Communities for Arbitration Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/20 (June 9, 1999) [hereinafter E.C. Request for Arbitration,
E.C.-Hormones] (noting that the E.C. disputed the initial amount of the
suspension requested by the United States and sought review of that award by an
arbitration panel).
202. See DSU, supra note 22, art. 22.8 (declaring that the suspension of
concessions is a temporary measure granted by the DSB under certain conditions
and can be maintained when the offending Member has not taken measures to
comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations).
203. See id. art. 22.1 (providing that the DSB only authorizes the suspension of
concessions when an offending Member fails to bring its inconsistent measures
into compliance with the DSB's rulings and recommendations within a reasonable
period of time). The DSB determines whether the offending Member has failed to
comply prior to granting authorization for the suspension of concessions. Id.
204. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of
Article 23.1 of the DSU, which mandates that Members have recourse to the
DSU's procedures exclusive of all other processes to resolve conflicts that fall
under the jurisdiction of the WTO Agreement).
205. See Panel Report, U.S.-Section 301 Trade Act, supra note 95, 7.43
("This . . . 'exclusive dispute resolution clause', is an important new element of
Members' rights and obligations under the DSU.").
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1. Council Directive 2003/74/EC is a "Measure Taken
to Comply " with the DSB Rulings
The DSB will find that Council Directive 2003/74/EC is a measure
that the E.C. took to comply with the DSB rulings and
recommendations from the initial dispute. 206 The United States
argues that the new Directive is different from the previously
invalidated Directive in name only.207 However, Council Directive
2003/74/EC is distinct from Council Directive 96/22/EC and is
meant to correct the inconsistencies of the DSB-invalidated
Directive. 20 8 As the DSB has noted, when a Member implements a
measure on the basis of bringing a previously invalidated measure
into compliance with DSB rulings and recommendations, the DSB
will view the newly implemented measure as one "'taken to comply
with [its] recommendations and rulings.' 20 9
The phrase "measure taken to comply" thus implies (1) DSB
invalidation of a certain measure and (2) action on the part of the
Member, whose measure the DSB has invalidated, to either remove
the invalidated measure or correct the previous inconsistencies to
ensure WTO compliance.210 In the present case, the DSB first
invalidated Council Directive 96/22/EC because it lacked the support
of sufficient scientific evidence demonstrated by a valid risk
206. See generally Debra Herz, Effects of International Arbitral Tribunals in
National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 246 (1995-1996) (observing
that "prior to the establishment of the WTO, the preferred method of resolution [of
an adverse ruling] was the phasing out of the challenged measure," but that the
WTO has changed its procedures to provide Members with time to bring their
measures into compliance).
207. See Nov. 7, 2003 DSB Meeting Minutes, supra note 80, 30.
208. See discussion supra Part II.A (outlining the steps that the E.C. took in
developing the new Directive, discussing why the E.C. took these steps to comply
with the previous DSB rulings and recommendations, and explaining why these
actions do comply with the DSB's previous rulings and recommendations).
209. Appellate Report, Canada-Civil Aircraft, supra note 118, 36 (asserting
that, in principle, a measure "taken to comply" is distinguishable from "the
measure which was the subject of the original dispute").
210. See id. (emphasizing that the phrase 'measure taken to comply' refers to
those measures that the Member takes in reaction to the DSB's rulings and
recommendations on a previous measure, thus making the two measures "separate
and distinct").
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assessment.211 In response, the E.C. sought more relevant scientific
evidence.212 Once the E.C. obtained valid scientific evidence
demonstrating a risk to human health, the European Parliament and
Council amended Directive 96/22/EC and enacted Directive
2003/74/EC with provisions that were more consistent with the
relevant scientific findings.2 3
This evidence demonstrates that the DSB's rulings regarding
Directive 96/22/EC influenced the E.C. to implement Directive
2003/74/EC to ensure WTO consistency. 214 Therefore, the DSB will
reject the U.S. claims and conclude that Directive 2003/74/EC is a
measure taken to comply with the DSB rulings.
2. The Continued Suspension of Concessions Constitutes
Unilateral Action Taken to Redress a Violation or
Existence of the E. C. SPS Measures
The DSB will find that Council Directive 2003/74/EC is a measure
taken to comply. 25 Therefore, by maintaining the suspension of
concessions, the United States seeks to redress what can only be
viewed as a perceived violation.216 Such action is unilateral under the
211. See discussion supra Part L.A (analyzing the findings and conclusions of
the DSB Panel and Appellate Bodies in the initial E.C.-Hormone dispute).
212. See Directive 2003/74, supra note 60, pmbl. 3 (noting that the E.C.
undertook the new risk assessment beginning in February 1998, immediately
following the release of the recommendations for compliance by the DSB).
213. See id. 13 (outlining the E.C.'s belief that the measures embodied in the
new Directive "are necessary to achieve the chosen level of health protection"
based on its own scientific information). "Moreover, there is no other means that is
reasonably available at present, taking into account technical and economic
feasibility, which is significantly less restrictive of trade and can achieve equally
effectively the chosen level of health protection." Id.
214. See Press Release, E.U. Complies with Hormone Beef Ruling, supra note
60 (explaining the background of the DSB ruling on Council Directive 96/22/EC
and how the E.C. worked to amend that Directive to bring its measures into
compliance with the DSB rulings and recommendations).
215. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (outlining the DSB's interpretation of a
measure taken to comply and arguing that the new Directive fits within that
interpretation).
216. See generally Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, supra note 105,
6.22 (commenting that a Member can seek to redress either a "perceived or WTO
determined violation").
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DSU until the United States obtains the DSB's determination as to
whether the measure actually does comply with the DSB rulings.217
The United States asserts that the Arbitration Body authorized the
current suspension of concessions and it is not seeking to redress a
new violation or the existence of a measure taken to comply.28 This
argument is based on the premise that the DSB has already reviewed
the E.C. SPS measures and found them to be incompatible with
WTO obligations.219 What the argument fails to acknowledge is that
Directive 2003/74/EC is a measure taken to comply with the
previous invalidated Directive and as such the DSB must consider it
as separate from the old Directive.2 0
Furthermore, the United States places too much emphasis on the
notion that the language and policy of the Directive remains largely
the same as the invalidated directive, thereby evidencing an
indisputable lack of change. This argument misinterprets the DSB
ruling in the initial E.C.-Hormones Panel Report.22 1 The DSB did
not determine that the E.C. measures were per se invalid.2 2 Rather,
the DSB concluded that the E.C. lacked the support of a valid risk
assessment to legitimately enact its measures.223 Consequently,
bringing the E.C. measures into compliance does not necessarily
require changing the language or policy of the Directive, it merely
217. See id. 6.23, 6.26 (indicating that when a violation is merely perceived,
the Member asserting the violation has recourse to the DSU alone).
218. See GAIN REPORT II, supra note 134, at 3 (suggesting that the United States
is still operating under the WTO's authorization for the suspension of concessions
stemming from the initial hormone dispute).
219. See WTO HORMONE CASE, supra note 145 (stating that the current
measures remain inconsistent with WTO obligations because of the lack of
sufficient supporting scientific evidence).
220. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1 (arguing that the E.C. enacted the new
Directive with the purpose of bringing its measures into compliance with the
rulings and recommendations of the DSB in the initial hormones dispute).
221. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (recounting the DSB's
findings and conclusions on the consistency of Council Directive 96/22/EC with
the SPS Agreement).
222. See Appellate Report, E.C. Measures, supra note 22, 246 (rejecting the
Panel's contention that the E.C. acted in an "arbitrary and unjustifiable" manner in
enacting the Directive solely as a means to create a discriminatory trade practice).
223. See id.
2005] 267
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
requires that the E.C. support the measures with a valid risk
assessment, which the E.C. has accomplished with the SCVPH
reports.224
Therefore, the Directive no longer contains the invalidated
deficiencies, thereby rendering the continued suspension of
concessions simply a response to a measure taken to comply.225 Just
as the U.S.-Certain E.C. Products Panel concluded, the DSB in the
present case will conclude that the current E.C. measure is a measure
taken to comply, 226 the alleged violation is merely a result of U.S.
perception, 227  and the United States must seek the DSB's
determination as to whether the measure actually does comply with
its rulings.228
3. The Continued Suspension of Concessions Is Unilateral Action
in Violation of WTO Obligations Regardless of When the
United States First Initiated the Suspension
The U.S. action is unilateral even though the DSB initially
authorized the suspension of concessions.229 In the present case, the
U.S. actions are similar to its response to E.C. measures in U.S.-
224. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1 (outlining the exact steps that the E.C. took
to ensure that its risk assessment would meet the requirements established by the
DSB to demonstrate a valid risk assessment).
225. See Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, supra note 96, 6.26
(concluding that the United States acted unilaterally when it imposed additional
obligations on certain E.C. products because the United States perceived the E.C.
to be in violation of its WTO obligations when it did not comply with the DSB's
rulings and recommendations within a reasonable time period, even though the
E.C. took measures to comply that the DSB itself had not yet evaluated).
226. Cf Appellate Report, Canada-Civil Aircraft, supra note 108, 36
(remarking that Canada presented a revised measure as a measure taken to comply
and the DSB was required to consider it accordingly).
227. See Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, supra note 96, 6.22
(explaining that a Member can seek to redress a violation that is "perceived,"
meaning that the WTO has not yet found that the violation actually exists).
228. See id. 6.26 (indicating that when a violation is merely perceived and not
WTO determined, the Member asserting the violation must have recourse to the
DSU alone, otherwise its actions are unilateral under the DSU).
229. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (observing that the DSB granted
the United States authorization to suspend concessions after the E.C. failed to bring
its measures within a reasonable period of time).
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Certain E.C. Products, where the Panel concluded that the U.S.
action was unilateral because the violation the United States sought
to redress was merely perceived.23° The United States is likely to
argue that a key difference between the two cases is that here, unlike
in U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, the DSB authorized the U.S. action
prior to initiation of the suspension of concessions. 3'
However, the U.S. argument fails for two important reasons. First,
regardless of when the United States took the action in this case, it
did so to redress a perceived violation or question the existence of a
measure taken to comply. 32 The DSB makes no distinction between
actions taken to redress a perceived violation after the authorization
to suspend concessions and those taken before the DSB grants
authorization. 233 The language of Article 21.5 explicitly and simply
states that Members must resort to the dispute settlement procedure
when there is a question as to the validity or existence of a measure
taken to comply with a DSB ruling.234
Second, the U.S. argument fails because Article 22.8 and the
Arbitration Body's prior holdings make clear that the authorized
suspension of concessions is a temporary remedy.235 The determining
230. See Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, supra note 96, 6.26
(concluding that the U.S. imposition of additional liabilities on certain E.C.
products amounted to an addition of tariffs above that which the DSB authorized,
violating the DSU's rules and procedures).
231. See id. 2.11-2.14 (indicating that the United States implemented its
retaliatory measures prior to the final ruling of the arbitration body, which
ultimately did authorize the United States to suspend concessions); see also
discussion supra Part I.F.2 (suggesting that the DSB authorized the United States
to suspend concessions after the E.C. failed to bring its measures into compliance
within the fifteen month reasonable period of time set by the Arbitration Body).
232. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1-B.2 (arguing that the New Directive is a
measure taken to comply and that the DSB view the U.S. maintenance of the
suspension of concessions as action to redress the Directive's perceived violation).
233. See DSU, supra note 22, art. 21.5.
234. See id.; see also Jason E. Kearns & Steve Charnovitz, Adjudicating
Compliance in the WTO: A Review of DSU Article 21.5, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 331,
342 (2002) (arguing that because Article 21.5 does not explicitly state that it
applies to post-retaliation situations to compel non-offending Members to resort to
such proceedings, an effective use in such situations is for the previously offending
Member to initiate proceedings under the Article 21.5).
235. See DSU, supra note 22, art. 22.8 (providing that the suspension of
concessions should last only so long as the measure found to be inconsistent
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factor is the offending Member's implementation of a measure taken
to comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations.236 Here, the
E.C. implemented a new Directive intended to comply with the
DSB.237 The DSU rules and procedures obligated the United States to
withdraw its suspension of concessions upon E.C. notification of the
new measure.2 38 From that point, the United States could have freely
exercised its right to bring the matter before the DSB.239 However,
the United States acted unilaterally, a move that the DSB will find
inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the DSU.24 °
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE DSB SHOULD USE THE U.S.-CONTINUED SUSPENSION
OF OBLIGATIONS CASE TO DECLARE THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE "PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE"
The DSB should use this latest case in the hormone dispute to
acknowledge the importance of the so-called "precautionary
principle," which nations often use to support health and safety
remains); see also Decision by the Arbitrators, Hormones, supra note 86, 40
(agreeing with the Panel from E.C.-Bananas Ill that the principle behind
imposing suspension of concession is "to induce compliance" from Members with
respect to the rulings and recommendations of the DSB (emphasis in original)).
236. See Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, supra note 96, 6.93
(concluding that "the term 'measure found to be inconsistent' assumes an
adjudicating process and must be read together with Article 23.2(a), which also
mandates WTO adjudication to determine whether a WTO violation has occurred).
Here the DSB found Council Directive 96/22/EC inconsistent with the SPS
Agreement, not Council Directive 2003/74/EC. See Panel Report, E.C. Measures,
supra note 21. Council Directive 2003/74/EC seeks to comply with the prior DSB
rulings and recommendations, but has not yet been subjected to adjudication by the
DSB.
237. See discussion supra Part II.A (noting that the E.C. promulgated Directive
2003/74/EC only after seeking sufficient scientific evidence to rationally and
objectively support its SPS measures in accordance with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB in E.C. -Hormones).
238. See DSU, supra note 22, art. 22.1.
239. See id. art. 21.5.
240. See discussion supra Part I.F. 1 (outlining the DSU and DSB's prohibition
against unilateral action to redress a perceived WTO violation).
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policies upon grounds other than just strict scientific evidence. 4'
This important principle recognizes the need for Members to
maintain sovereignty over their measures, even though such
decisions are partly based on public policy considerations.242
However, the WTO has become increasingly reluctant to allow
Members to interject public policy into the evaluation of a measure's
validity, focusing instead on strict harmonization of standards.243
The E.C.-Hormones case is perhaps the perfect example of a
dispute arising from the intersection between the need for
establishing international harmonization and the need for Members
to maintain their sovereign right to acknowledge public policy goals
within their health and safety measures. 244 Few would dispute the
importance of working toward eliminating arbitrary and unjustified
trade barriers.2 45 However, the WTO must not do so at the expense of
a Member's right to consider more than just hard scientific evidence
when developing health and safety measures to protect their
citizens.246
241. See SPS Agreement, supra note 13, pmbl. ("[N]o Member should be
prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health. . . ."); see also John S. Applegate, The Taming of the
Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 13, 51-52
(2002) (acknowledging that the precautionary principle is an element of SPS
Agreement Article 5.7, but is only accepted after a demonstration of scientific
uncertainty).
242. See Regine Neugebauer, Note, Fine-Tuning WTO Jurisprudence and the
SPS Agreement: Lessons from the Beef Hormone Case, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1255, 1258 (2000) (stating that the drafters of the SPS Agreement intended
for the determination of acceptable levels of risk to be an exclusively political
decision that is the right of Members to decide for themselves).
243. See Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization:
The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization Standards, 50 U. KAN. L.
REv. 823, 829 (2002) (observing that a major principle behind the concept of
standardizing policies is "maximizing economic efficiency" of international trade).
244. See discussion supra Introduction (commenting on the various motivations
behind the actions of the E.C. and United States).
245. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Illegality of Unilateral Trade Measures to
Resolve Trade-Environment Disputes, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
375, 398 (1998) (suggesting that the SPS Agreement is supposed to be a
mechanism to distinguish between measures designed to protect domestic industry
and those legitimately designed to ensure health and safety).
246. See Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Note, Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the
World Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process
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The DSB has in fact acknowledged that the SPS agreement
embodies this important principle.247 Yet the principle remains an
afterthought within DSB jurisprudence, with the DSB choosing
instead to place the greatest emphasis on whether Members follow
the strict process that ensures the harmonization of health and safety
measures affecting trade among WTO Members.248
To properly acknowledge the importance of the precautionary
principle, the DSB must place greater emphasis on whether Members
are acting arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory when enacting
SPS measures. 249 For example, the DSB acknowledged the universal
nature of the E.C. hormone ban.250 However, the fact that the E.C.
measures were not arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory was not
dispositive in the DSB's evaluation.25" ' Now that the E.C. is in a
prime position to invoke Article 5.7, the DSB should make a clear
declaration that it will give deference to Members' sovereign right to
determine appropriate levels of safety for their citizens so long as
Members do not act arbitrarily or in an unjustifiably discriminatory
manner.
252
to Achieve Compliance from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
133, 167 (2001) (explaining that noncompliance with WTO decisions will become
more prevalent if the WTO continues to ignore the need for Members to maintain a
certain level of sovereignty in developing their health and safety measures).
247. See, e.g., Appellate Report, E. C. Measures, supra note 22, 124 (affirming
that the precautionary principle is embodied within SPS Agreement Articles 5.7
and 3.3, as well as the Preamble).
248. See id. 125 (upholding the Panel's conclusion that SPS Agreement
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 were the primary considerations in this case).
249. See Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific
Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 353, 359 (2002)
(suggesting that the E.C. had legitimate reasons for banning the use of growth
hormones and did not impose the ban as a disguised trade barrier).
250. See Appellate Report, E. C. Measures, supra note 22, 244 (observing that
the ban not only affected U.S. exports to Europe, but it also impacted European
exports to the United States).
251. See id. 246, 253-55 (reversing the Panel's conclusion that the E.C. acted
arbitrarily or in an unjustifiably discriminatory manner, but affirming the
conclusion that the hormone measures were invalid).
252. See Mystery Bridgers, Comment, Genetically Modified Organisms and the
Precautionary Principle: How the GMO Dispute Before the World Trade
Organization Could Decide the Fate of GMO Regulation, 22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 171, 184 (remarking that many nations incorporate the precautionary
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B. THE DSB SHOULD USE THE U.S.-CONTINUED SUSPENSION OF
OBLIGATIONS CASE TO ESTABLISH THAT MEMBERS WHO
REFUTE ANOTHER MEMBER'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE
DSB MUST RESORT TO ARTICLE 21.5 PROCEEDINGS
The DSB should take this opportunity to bring clarity to the scope
of DSU Article 21.5 by declaring that original complainants must
initiate Article 21.5 proceedings when contesting an offending
Member's compliance with the DSB.253 The DSB should state
unequivocally that original complainants must adhere to this process
regardless of whether the DSB already granted authorization to
suspend concessions.2 4 This would force the original complainant to
engage in the dispute and work toward an expedient resolution under
DSB observation rather than hiding behind the DSB's previous grant
of suspension authorization.255
Under current DSU jurisprudence there is no enforcement
mechanism compelling a Member, who the DSB previously
authorized to suspend concessions, to resort to Article 21.5
proceedings when it disputes the validity of measures taken to
comply. 2 6 Rather, such Members can easily stand by and maintain
the suspension of concessions, forcing the previously offending
Member to initiate such proceedings if it wishes to end the
principle within their own domestic law, and arguing that it is a part of customary
international law).
253. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (contending that the absence of specific
language indicating that the article only applies within the designated "reasonable
period of time" should be construed to mean the article applies to all measures
taken to comply).
254. See Panel Report, U.S.-Certain E.C. Products, supra note 96, 6.92
(emphasizing that Article 21.5 includes a substantive requirement, similar to that
of Article 23.2(a), imposing on Members the obligation of exclusive use of the
WTO dispute settlement process).
255. See Kearns & Chamovitz, supra note 234, at 341-42 (proposing that the
availability of Article 21.5 to original defendants may be the only realistic way for
the withdrawal of retaliatory measures under current DSB jurisprudence).
256. See DSU supra note 22, art. 22.8 (providing that an authorized suspension
of concessions lasts until an offending Member complies with the DSB, but
providing no indication regarding who makes the determination of compliance).
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suspension of concessions." 7  This inherently allows original
complainants to make unilateral decisions while placing the full
burden on the previously offending Member to initiate an action,
which is against fundamental DSB principles.
258
To correct this procedural flaw, the DSB should require the
original complainant to postpone its suspension of concessions when
an offending Member notifies the DSB and the original complainant
that the previously inconsistent measures are in compliance with the
DSB rulings.259  Such a requirement ensures that original
complainants seek expedient resolution of the dispute.26 ° If the DSB
finds the measures are in compliance then it would no longer
authorize the suspension of concessions.261 If, however, the DSB
concludes that the measures do not comply then the original
complainant could resume the suspension, applying it retroactively to
the date of postponement and thus eliminate the potential for
Members to reap benefits from bad faith notifications.262 In the end,
this procedure mirrors the current WTO dispute settlement process
257. See Kearns & Charnovitz, supra note 234, at 333 (emphasizing that the
primary purpose of Article 21.5 is to ensure prompt compliance in order promote
expeditious resolution of trade disputes).
258. See Panel Report, U.S.-Section 301 Trade Act, supra note 95, 7.43
(stating that the force of the DSU is of a dual nature whereby it grants Members
the right to have recourse to the dispute settlement process, while obligating them
at the same time to abide by the very same process); see also Seung Wha Chang,
Taming Unilateralism Under the Multilateral Trading System: Unfinished Job in
the WTO Panel Ruling on U.S. Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1151, 1196 (2000) (arguing that Members of the WTO
agreement have a certain expectation of enjoying the procedural benefits embodied
within the DSU and that violations of the DSU most certainly nullify those
benefits).
259. See discussion supra Part I.F (observing that the United States has
consistently refused to remove or postpone the suspension of concessions,
claiming a right to do so under the DSB award).
260. See Kearns & Charnovitz, supra note 234, at 341-42 (commenting on the
propensity for a Member to be content with the "status quo" once the DSB awards
a suspension of concessions and suggesting that this propensity may not be
advantageous in the course of finding a resolution to the dispute).
261. See DSU, supra note 22, art. 22.8 (providing that the suspension of
concessions is intended as a temporary measure and must be terminated upon
compliance by the offending Member).
262. See id.
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whereby Members must prove the validity of their measures only
after a complaining Member initiates an action, and the DSB
authorizes the suspension of concessions only after a full review of
the measures in dispute.263
In the current dispute, this would mean that the United States
should have postponed the suspension of concessions in October
2003.26 Whether they should resume or be withdrawn completely
will necessarily depend on the final DSB determination.
CONCLUSION
E.C. Council Directive 2003/74/EC is a measure taken to comply,
and in fact does comply, with the DSB's rulings and
recommendations. 265 The E.C. hormone measures are now consistent
with the SPS Agreement because they are rationally and objectively
supported by sufficient scientific evidence from a valid risk
assessment.2 66 Further, the United States is acting unilaterally by
refusing to acknowledge the new Directive as a measure taken to
comply and by maintaining its suspension of concessions.267
Accordingly, the WTO should use this case to state unequivocally
that DSU Article 21.5 applies universally whenever one Member
questions the validity of another's measure. 6 s In deciding this case
and those like it in the future, the WTO should ensure that the
precautionary principle becomes an important element of future DSB
263. See generally Brimeyer, supra note 246, at 143-46 (summarizing the WTO
dispute settlement process).
264. See E.C. Communication 22, supra note 80.
265. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1 (outlining the important role of the
SCVPH reports in providing scientific support for the E.C. SPS measures).
266. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating that it is rational to prohibit
the use of growth hormones where the scientific evidence shows a risk of adverse
health effects from the increased exposure to the residues of such hormones).
267. See discussion supra Part II.B (demonstrating that the Directive is a
measure taken to comply with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB and
that by maintaining the suspension of concessions the United States is seeking to
redress what it merely perceives to be the absence of a measure taken to comply).
268. See discussion supra Part III.B (proposing a process for the DSB to ensure
that original complaining Members adhere to DSU Article 21.5, even after the
DSB authorizes the suspension of concessions).
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jurisprudence by granting more importance to whether a measure is
arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory.269
269. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that the precautionary principle is
an important element of a Member's health and safety measure development that
the WTO should acknowledge in addition to harmonization of standards).
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